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AMERICA 

AFTER 

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'AMERICAN 

JURIST 


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UNIVERSITY  Of  mpomiA 

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AMERICA 
AFTER  THE  WAR 


AMERICA 
AFTER  THE  WAR 


BY 
AN  AMERICAN  JURIST 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1918 


Copyright,  1918,  by 
The  Century  Co. 


Copyright,  1918,  by 
The  New  York  Times  Company 


Published,  March,  1918 


The  general  interest  aroused  by  the 
communications  of  An  American  Jurist 
while  the  series  was  in  the  course  of  pub- 
lication in  the  New  York  Times  during 
the  month  of  January  is  the  warrant 
for  their  reproduction  in  book  form. 

It  should  be  said  here  that  the  title, 
"An  American  Jurist,"  was  not  of  the 
author's  choosing.  As  the  communica- 
tions were  published  anonymously,  it 
was  necessary  to  indicate  in  some  man- 
ner the  quality  and  the  authority  of  the 
writer  and  they  were  described  in  the 
Times  as  coming  from  the  pen  of  An 
American  Jurist,  an  ascription  of  au- 
thority which,  while  appropriate  and  ac- 
curate, the  author's  modesty  might  have 
disclaimed. 

March,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  America  and  the  War     ...      8 

II  Belgium  and  Luxemburg      .     .     22 

III  The  Balkans 43 

IV  The  Sequel  of  the  War      .     .     54 
V    Mexico 64 

VI    Canada 80 

VII    The  West  Indies 99 

VIII  Asia  and  the  Pacific   .     .     .     .112 

IX  America  after  the  War  .     .     .123 

X    Democracy 134 

XI  An  American  Merchant  Marine  171 

XII    Preparedness 186 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE 
WAR 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE 
WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

AMEBICA   AND   THE   WAR 

When  the  national  authorities  acted, 
and  America  became  a  belligerent  in  one 
of  the  most  stupendous  wars  in  history, 
the  duty  of  Americans  to  their  country 
was  clear :  they  were  bound  to  sustain  the 
successful  prosecution  of  the  war  by 
every  legitimate  means  in  their  power. 
Nevertheless,  without  impropriety  they 
may  continue  to  differ  concerning  the 
ends  and  the  ultimate  effects  of  the  war 
on  the  future  of  the  nation  and  on  civi- 
lization in  general.  The  right  to  free- 
dom of  opinion  does  not,  however,  abro- 

3 


4     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

gate  the  duty  of  an  American  not  to  em- 
barrass his  Government  by  useless  dis- 
cussion. No  further  debate,  for  exam- 
ple, concerning  the  propriety  of  a  war  is 
admissible  in  any  orderly  state  after 
war  is  once  duly  declared.  The  laws 
which  underlie  national  existence  do  not 
permit  individual  or  domestic  opposition 
to  the  national  authority  in  time  of  war ; 
but  the  liberty  postulated  of  a  republic 
does  permit  a  reasonable  discussion,  in 
the  abstract,  of  the  future  national  prob- 
lems affected  by  the  war. 

All  modern  wars  between  nations  are 
in  the  last  analysis  founded  on  national 
interest  and  national  honor,  which  are  al- 
most identical  terms.  Other  causes  may 
be  assigned  by  political  parties,  and  in 
popular  governments  other  causes  are 
often  necessarily  assigned  when  the  cit- 
izenship is  indifferent  to  the  national 
honor  or  oblivious  of  the  urgency  of 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR       5 

the  paramount  national  interest.  The 
United  States  had  an  ample  casus  belli 
on  which  to  found  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany.  The  conduct  of  Ger- 
many prior  to  1917  had  violated  the  prin- 
cipal laws  of  war  {jura  belli),  to  the 
great  injury  of  the  American  nation. 
The  wonder  is  that  American  politicians 
and  even  the  national  authorities  so  long 
absolutely  ignored  or  tolerated  what  was 
generally  apparent.  But  underneath  all 
the  causes  avowed  for  America's  en- 
tering the  war  lay  that  mainspring  of  na- 
tional action — the  national  safety  and 
the  national  interest.  Prior  to  1914  it 
had  long  been  foreseen  by  thoughtful 
men  that  America  would  sooner  or  later 
be  obliged  to  enter  into  a  war  with  Ger- 
many. The  present  time  was  certainly 
an  opportune  time  for  America  to  begin 
hostilities  that  were  inevitable.  Long 
anterior  to  the  present  war  Germany  was 


6     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

known  to  regard  with  invidious  eyes  this 
hemisphere,  its  institutions,  its  preten- 
sions, and  its  peculiar  and  phenomenal 
development.  It  should  be  confessed 
that  America  in  the  past  has  not  been 
most  favorably  regarded  by  European 
governments.  Between  the  political 
thought  of  Europe  and  the  political 
thought  of  America  lies  a  great  abyss 
far  deeper  than  the  separating  seas. 
Only  time  can  satisfactorily  bridge  this 
chasm. 

Between  Germany  and  America  in 
particular  there  has  long  been  a  latent 
misunderstanding.  Since  1870,  given 
an  opportune  moment,  American  inter- 
ests would  have  been  unhesitatingly  as- 
sailed by  Germany  with  all  the  force 
and  power  it  could  command.  For  this 
reason,  if  for  no  other,  it  was  the  interest 
of  the  American  Government  to  meet  the 
inevitable  issue  with  Germany  at  least  as 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR      7 

soon  as  it  did,  and  it  is  its  duty  to  wage 
the  war  with  all  the  power  and  force  it 
can  command. 

Some  of  the  provocative  causes  ably 
stated  by  President  Wilson  in  his  ad- 
dress to  Congress,  April  2,  1917,  and  as- 
signed as  reasons  for  the  entrance  of 
America  into  a  foreign  war,  have  not 
become  of  less  moment  now  that  America 
is  at  war.  Their  indirect  purpose  was 
the  conviction  of  those  Americans  who 
think  little  concerning  the  laws  which 
control  the  struggles  for  human  and  na- 
tional existence.  That  America  was  jus- 
tified in  her  declaration  of  war  for  many 
reasons  not  stated  by  the  President  the 
world  in  the  end  will  concede.  Her 
imperiled  national  interests  alone  af- 
forded ample  justification  for  such  a 
declaration.  But  in  pragmatic  England 
and  in  practical  America  political  and 
national  movements  are  singularly  pro- 


8     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

moted  by  sentimental  considerations, 
sometimes  pertinent,  at  others  irrele- 
vant, but  always  skilfully  manipulated 
by  those  more  discerning  public  men 
who  have  closer  at  heart  the  national 
interests  and  well-being,  and  who  them- 
selves need  no  other  incentive  besides 
the  national  interests  for  even  such  an 
extreme  action  as  public  war. 

For  the  honor  of  humanity  it  is  sad  to 
have  to  admit  that  sentiment  of  itself  is 
never  a  valid  reason  of  state  for  extreme 
national  measures.  In  the  minds  of 
statesmen  of  any  country  sentiment  is 
not  the  real  reason  for  war,  though  it  is 
often  made  use  of  by  public  men  in  order 
to  influence  some  desired  public  action. 
Patriotism  is  not  a  sentiment.  It  is  to 
belittle  the  nobility  of  mankind  to  affirm 
that  the  love  of  God,  of  family,  of  coun- 
try, of  liberty,  and  of  justice  is  a  senti- 
ment.   This  natural  affection  is  a  priori 


AMEEICA  AND  THE  WAR      9 

and  inborn ;  it  is  dictated  by  the  sense  of 
self-preservation;  it  is  an  elementary 
principle  of  being.  For  country,  family, 
and  liberty  men  will  fight  until  the  end  of 
time.  In  well-constructed  human  beings 
sentiment  plays  a  minor  part.  At  so 
grave  a  time  as  this  Americans  need  no 
such  artificial  stimulus  as  sentiment  to 
induce  them  to  support  their  Govern- 
ment in  an  international  issue  involving 
the  safety  of  their  country,  their  fami- 
lies, and  their  liberty.  As  is  the  case 
with  most  abstractions,  sentiment  would 
not  at  any  time  be  a  safe  criterion  for 
public  measures.  It  is  as  often  ill 
founded  as  well  founded,  and  conse- 
quently it  is  never  a  prudent  or  a  de- 
liberate reason  for  the  great  finality  of  a 
nation.  It  is  the  national  interest  and 
honor  alone  which  in  the  end  control  the 
external  actions  of  a  state.  In  any  dis- 
cussion   of   the    problems    involved    in 


10     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

this  war,  therefore,  sentiment  should  be 
allowed  to  play  only  a  minor  part.  Al- 
liances between  nations  are  not  deter- 
mined by  considerations  of  sentiment. 
Common  interests  and  advantages  for 
the  time  being  afford  the  sufficient  in- 
ducement for  either  defensive  or  offen- 
sive alliances  of  nations. 

Since  the  ascent  of  Prussia  to  the 
hegemony  and  direction  of  Germany, 
English  public  men  have  been  with  rea- 
son profoundly  disturbed.  They  have 
seen  with  disquietude  the  long  commer- 
cial supremacy  of  England  challenged 
with  effect  by  Germany ;  they  have  seen 
the  colonial  policy  of  England  and  the 
integrity  of  its  widely  extended  empire 
frequently  menaced  by  unmistakable 
overtures.  Indeed,  for  tlie  last  fifty 
years  thinking  men  in  England  and  else- 
where have  foreseen  that  a  straggle  be- 
tween the  English  and  the  German  em- 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR    11 

pires  was  inevitable.  Men  in  both  na- 
tions have  long  been  shouting,  "Delenda 
est  Carthago!"  to  the  increasing  discom- 
fiture of  the  rest  of  the  world.  Both 
Germany  and  England  have  in  their  own 
way  silently  prepared  for  the  struggle, 
indirectly  by  alliances  and  international 
conversations,  and  directly  by  increased 
armaments  either  on  the  land  or  on  the 
sea.  It  would  have  been  far  better  for 
the  Entente  Allies  if  England  had  not 
confined  her  preliminary  preparations  so 
largely  to  the  seas.  Her  allies  have 
been  forced  to  bear  the  brunt  of  her  over- 
sight. Indeed,  it  would  have  been  far 
less  costly  to  the  British  Empire  itself 
had  England's  preparations  on  land 
kept  better  step  with  the  pace  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has 
lately  admitted  that  England  somewhat 
neglected  the  obvious  duty  to  arm  on 
land,  and  that  the  neglect  would  not 


12     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

occur  again.  England 's  excuse  for  neg- 
lect is  no  mystery.  She  used  her  na- 
tional resources  the  better  to  extend  for 
the  time  being  her  challenged  commercial 
supremacy. 

In  so  far  as  America  was  concerned, 
England's  increased  armament  was 
never  disquieting.  All  the  other  ex- 
ternal actions  of  England  were  not,  how- 
ever, so  reassuring  to  America.  Ante- 
rior to  the  War  of  1914  many  English 
statesmen  endeavored  to  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  Germany.  In  such  a 
possible  understanding  lurked  the  great- 
est peril  to  this  country.  As  existing 
national  alliances  and  ententes  are  very 
temporary,  it  is  thought  by  some  public 
men,  even  in  England's  own  empire,  that 
this  country  has  not  yet  escaped  all  ulti- 
mate danger  of  such  an  association. 
Regardless  of  that  now  remote  possibil- 
ity, the  interest  of  America  in  the  pres- 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR     13 

ent  conflict  unquestionably  lies  with 
England  and  her  allies.  To  aid  France 
Cardinal  Richelieu  did  not  hesitate  to 
promote  Protestantism.  He  was  a 
statesman  of  the  first  order.  Any  mina- 
tory combinations  of  the  great  powers 
which  the  future  may  unfold  are  too  re- 
mote to  furnish  ground  for  any  hesitancy 
on  the  part  of  America  to  cooperate 
heartily  with  England  and  her  allies 
throughout  the  present  war.  Neverthe- 
less, the  American  aims  in  the  final  is- 
sues of  the  war  are  not  and  cannot  be 
identical  with  the  ends  of  England.  In 
Asia  their  separate  interests  have  of  late 
widely  diverged.  It  is  reasonably  clear 
that  the  pronounced  aims  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  are  not  even  now  the  aims  of 
most  of  the  other  leading  public  men  of 
England.  It  is  therefore  safe  to  predict 
that  the  program  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
will  not  be  prominent  in  the  final  adjust- 


14     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

ments  of  the  pending  war  by  the  powers. 
As  to  the  respective  merits  of  the  two 
leading  belligerents,  England  and  Ger- 
many, in  the  War  of  1914,  America  has 
not  hesitated  to  form  an  opinion.  Eng- 
land is  a  free  and  great  country.  Her 
public  men  are  far  more  astute  in  the 
business  of  government  than  the  German 
public  men  or  any  other  public  men. 
Even  the  English  colonial  empire,  the 
duration  of  which  is  much  involved  in 
this  war,  has,  since  the  independence  of 
America,  been  admirably  administered 
in  the  main,  and  the  high  commercial 
principles  applied  in  colonial  adminis- 
tration have  produced  good  results.  If 
we  except  the  loss  of  liberty  and  inde- 
pendence of  some  of  the  subject  popula- 
tions of  England,  there  has  been  little  to 
condemn  in  the  English  colonial  system. 
In  all  her  colonies  England  has  had  since 
1783  more  regard  for  justice  and  human 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR    15 

rights  than  has  ever  been  displayed  by 
any  other  colonial  system.  It  is  this 
fact  which  has  made  the  dependent 
status  tolerable  in  the  English  colonies 
and  dependencies,  and  in  several  in- 
stances even  desirable  for  them.  It  is 
the  general  opinion  in  America  that  the 
colonial  system  of  England  has  for  a 
century  been  more  nearly  perfect  than 
any  other  colonial  system  known  to  his- 
tory. There  is  not,  however,  a  general 
consensus  in  America  that  the  English 
colonial  system  either  in  India  or  Egypt 
is  abstractly  justifiable.  But  taking  the 
English  colonial  system  as  it  is,  this 
country,  as  a  whole,  has  not  viewed  with 
favor  the  desires  of  Germany  to  disrupt 
or  partition  it. 

It  is  not  extreme  to  affirm  that  the  am- 
bition of  Germany  to  enter  the  ranks  of 
the  great  colonial  powers  has  been  con- 
templated  with    disfavor   not    only   in 


16     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

America,  but  by  the  entire  non-Germanie 
world.  America  in  the  main  distrusts, 
with  or  without  sound  reason,  all  colo- 
nial systems  whatever,  but  particularly 
the  German.  Of  those  existing  it  un- 
doubtedly favors  the  British.  American 
sympathies  with  the  colonial  system  of 
England  have  in  the  pending  conflict 
been  much  promoted  by  the  conviction 
that  since  1914  the  Germans  have  delib- 
erately violated  the  laws  of  war,  labori- 
ously built  up  since  the  time  of  Grotius. 
The  early  attempt  of  England  to  starve 
by  a  new  system  of  blockade  the  civilian 
population  of  Germany  did  not  meet 
with  prompt  condemnation  in  America 
because  of  the  coarse  German  methods 
of  warfare  and  the  instinctive  conviction 
of  Americans  that  Germany  was  as  hos- 
tile to  America  as  to  England.  It  was 
foreseen  from  the  outset  that  the  War  of 
1914,  beyond  all  other  modern  wars,  was 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR     17 

bound  to  be  a  war  a  out  ranee,  and  that 
American  interests  were  likely  to  be 
gravely  imperiled  by  the  leading  bellig- 
erents. The  President  and  the  present 
Government  were  evidently  from  the  be- 
ginning deeply  concerned,  and  they  acted 
with  caution  and  uniform  discretion. 
As  the  sequel  showed,  their  concern  was 
well  founded. 

Americans  are  not  a  thoughtless  peo- 
ple, and  they  are  now  beginning  to  think 
of  the  future,  after  the  present  war  shall 
end.  That  the  past  alliances  between 
nations  have  not  been  of  long  duration 
history  demonstrates  to  them.  At  pres- 
ent America  finds  herself  engaged  on 
the  side  of  four  or  five  powers  of  the  first 
rank;  some  of  them  have  long  been 
friendly  to  America,  others  not  uni- 
formly so.  The  alliance,  or,  if  pre- 
ferred, the  present  coordination,  of 
America  with  the  Entente  powers,  is  en- 


18     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

tirely  fortuitous;  it  is  pursuant  to  no 
treaty,  or  even  international  conversa- 
tion. It  is  dictated,  as  aU  other  inter- 
national arrangements  and  alliances 
have,  in  fact,  been  dictated,  solely  by  the 
best  interests  for  the  time  being  and  the 
supposed  safety  of  the  allied  countries. 
All  such  alliances  are  at  best  but  tem- 
porary. In  the  past  England  and 
France  have  more  often  been  enemies 
than  allies.  In  the  more  general  con- 
flicts of  the  world  America  and  England 
have  heretofore  been  uniformly  enemies. 
France  and  Russia  have  in  turn  been 
enemies  and  allies.  Prussia  and  Eng- 
land have  been  both  allies  and  enemies. 
France  and  Prussia  have  been  allied 
against  England,  while  Austria,  France, 
and  Russia  have  been  allies  against  Eng- 
land and  Prussia  combined.  The  past 
combinations,  indeed,  have  been  very 
curious  and  inconsistent.    In  each  in- 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR    19 

stance  the  supposed  interest  of  the  allies 
alone  governed.  The  course  of  history 
never  stops.  What  has  been  will  be 
again.^ 

1  The  inconsistent  alliances  between  European  coim- 
tries  are  enumerated  by  a  recent  French  writer  as 
follows : 

The  alliances  of  Burgundy  and  England  against 
Franc«,  then  of  Burgundy  and  France  against  Eng- 
land; of  France,  Venice,  and  Turkey  against  Austria 
and  Spain;  of  France,  Saxony,  and  the  Palatinate 
against  Austria;  of  France,  Sweden,  and  the  Nether- 
lands against  Spain  and  Austria;  of  France  and 
Prussia  against  Austria  and  England,  then  of  Aus- 
tria, France,  Sweden,  and  Russia  against  Prussia 
and  England ;  of  France,  Spain,  and  the  United  States 
against  England;  of  all  the  nations  of  Europe  against 
France;  of  France,  England,  and  Piedmont  against 
Russia;  of  France  and  Italy  against  Austria;  the 
moral  or  immoral  entente  of  Prussia,  England,  and 
France  against  Austria;  alliance  of  Prussia  and  the 
North  German  States,  morally  aided  by  England, 
against  France;  of  France  and  Russia  against  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Italy,  with  England  in  the  back- 
ground; of  Japan  and  England  against  Russia;  in 
order  to  bring  about  the  present  combination,  in 
which  fabricators  of  empty  phrases  see  the  supreme 
struggle  between  "civilization"  and  "barbarism,"  but 
in  which  well-informed  minds  see  only  a  new  and 
intense  form  of  a  conflict  of  interests  dividing  Eu- 
rope and  the  world.  [Translated  from  "Hier,  Au- 
jourd'hui,  Demain,"  p.  155,  Bourassa.] 


20     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

That  the  policy  of  America  in  the 
present  war  should  be  formulated  by  its 
statesmen,  and  not  by  its  politicians,  is 
evident.  Statesmen  govern  a  country 
with  an  eye  to  the  future  good  of  the  na- 
tion. Politicians  are  mere  opportunists. 
The  difference  between  them  is  marked. 
Taking  into  consideration  the  brevity  of 
all  international  alliances,  the  impera- 
tive duty  of  American  statesmen  is  to 
make  sure  that  in  the  course  of  a  tem- 
porary alliance  with  European  powers 
the  best  interests  of  the  American  na- 
tion are  not  imperiled.  There  are  with 
the  allies  of  America  outstanding  prob- 
lems of  grave  importance.  Any  error 
in  regard  to  them  will  inflict  untold  mis- 
eries upon  posterity.  Most  interna- 
tional alliances,  while  necessary,  are  full 
of  ultimate  dangers.  For  this  reason 
European  alliances  have  not  been  here- 
tofore favored  in  America.    That  they 


AMERICA  AND  THE  WAR    21 

have  now  become  necessary  and  must 
long  continue  is  generally  admitted,  al- 
though it  is  a  departure  from  an  ancient 
tradition.  Unintentionally,  America  has 
against  her  will  at  last  been  forced  to 
enter  a  new  and  difficult  foreign  arena. 
The  great  question  is.  Will  it  adequately 
prepare  for  the  new  responsibilities 
which  the  entrance  entails'?  If  it  does 
not,  the  future  of  America  will  be  un- 
necessarily jeoparded,  and  the  natural 
course  of  American  history  will  be  much 
influenced. 

To  the  world  in  general  the  ''United 
States"  par  excellence  is  known  as 
''America."  In  the  course  of  these  pa- 
pers America  has  therefore  been  ac- 
cepted as  the  more  familiar  title  of  the 
United  States.  Only  in  some  instances, 
where  greater  particularity  was  essen- 
tial to  clarity,  has  the  official  designation 
been  employed. 


CHAPTER  II 

BELGIUM   AND   LUXEMBURG 

To  enforce  Belgian  neutrality  is  not 
the  primary  reason  why  America  en- 
gaged in  the  war  against  Germany,  nor 
is  the  violation  of  the  spirit  of  Ameri- 
can democracy  the  real  reason.  The 
great  injuries  suffered  by  the  Belgians 
in  the  present  war  have  been  deplored 
by  Americans,  who  have  done  much  to 
alleviate  the  plight  of  Belgium. 
Throughout  their  entire  national  exist- 
ence Americans  have  evinced  a  marked 
sense  of  public  justice;  they  have 
showed  themselves  to  be  in  the  main  a 
just  and  kindly  people.  But  as  Amer- 
ica was  not  a  party  to  the  neutraliza- 

22 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    23 

tion  of  Belgium,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
an  infraction  of  Belgian  neutrality  by 
any  of  the  parties  to  the  Neutrality 
Treaty  of  November  15,  1831,  could  by 
the  law  of  nations  be  vindicated  by 
America.  This  was  obviously  the  con- 
clusion at  first  reached  at  Washington. 
Americans  could  and  did  protest  against 
the  violation ;  but  officially  America  had 
no  standing  to  protest  or  to  vindicate  a 
treaty  of  neutralization  to  which  Amer- 
ica was  not  a  party. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  the  state  of  po- 
litical parties  and  the  conditions  of  her 
parliamentary  government  did  not  per- 
mit England  to  act  with  more  efficiency 
in  the  first  days  of  the  War  of  1914. 
That  the  safety  of  Belgium  was  in  the 
first  instance  adequately  protected  by 
any  of  the  guarantors  of  her  neutrality 
is  not  clear.  The  preliminary  pourpar- 
lers in  1914  between  England  and  Ger- 


24     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

many,  when  examined  carefully,  leave 
the  impression  that  the  English  minis- 
ters did  not  insist  firmly  enough  on  the 
right  of  Belgium  to  immunity  from  inva- 
sion in  the  event  of  war.  Up  to  July 
31,  1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said  to 
the  French  representative,  "The  pres- 
ervation of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
might  be,  I  would  not  say  a  decisive,  but 
an  important  factor  in  determining  our 
attitude."  (British  White  Book  of 
1914,  No.  119.)  Would  Sir  Edward  not 
have  been  justified  in  making  his  declar- 
ation stronger! 

Belgium,  in  the  eyes  of  America,  pre- 
sents one  of  the  most  melancholy  as  well 
as  one  of  the  most  heroic  spectacles  in 
modern  history.  Her  sad  plight  has  ex- 
cited their  profound  sympathy.  That 
Belgium  will  emerge  intact  and  resume 
her  national  existence,  Americans  hope 
and  expect.    What  the  ultimate  destiny 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    25 

of  Belgium  may  be  in  the  centuries  to 
come  is  another  matter  which  no  states- 
man of  Europe  would  venture  to  pre- 
dict. But  one  thing  may  be  affirmed: 
Belgium  in  the  future  is  not  going  to 
repeat  her  present  experience  if  it  can 
be  helped. 

It  is  an  error  to  assume  that  Belgium 
is  the  cause  of  the  war  of  1914  or  even 
the  cause  of  England's  belligerency. 
Belgium  is  only  one  incident  of  the  great 
war,  not  its  causa  causans.  Many  peo- 
ple in  this  country  have  lost  sight  of  the 
fact  that  this  war  is  in  its  origin  a  war 
for  supremacy  in  the  Balkans,  which  in- 
cidentally set  on  fire  the  long-conflicting 
pretensions  of  Germany  and  England. 
To  the  people  of  the  Orient  the  present 
war  is  one  for  the  control  of  the  Eu- 
ropean approaches  to  the  far  East.  To 
the  average  American  the  war  is  one  for 
the  principle  of  democracy.    But  what- 


26     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

ever  the  object  of  the  war,  Americans 
in  or  out  of  public  life,  with  ample  jus- 
tification, have  come  to  believe  that  the 
triumphant  success  of  Germany  in  Eu- 
rope would  be  disastrous  to  America. 
It  is  not  compatible  with  the  safety  of 
America  that  there  should  be  only  one 
great  power  in  Europe  and  that  power 
unfriendly  to  America.  The  arroga- 
tions  of  such  a  power  would  soon  extend 
to  this  hemisphere;  they  would  menace 
its  integrity,  and  possibly  destroy  for 
centuries  the  national  policies  and  the 
proper  development  of  America.  This 
is  a  correct,  if  instinctive,  conclusion  for 
Americans. 

That  the  status  of  Belgium  was  not  the 
primary  cause  of  the  war,  history  dem- 
onstrates. Belgium  never  has  been,  ac- 
cording to  the  publicists'  definition,  a 
completely  sovereign  state.  Belgium  as 
a  state  was  the  product  of  the  fears  of 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    27 

Europe.  Torn  away  from  Holland  only 
in  1830,  Belgium,  by  the  concerted  action 
of  England  and  France,  was  erected  into 
an  independent,  but  neutralized,  state  by 
the  convention  of  the  five  great  powers 
convened  in  London  in  the  year  1830. 
In  the  erection  of  a  single  state  com- 
posed of  the  Flemish  and  the  Walloon 
provinces,  formerly  a  part  of  the  United 
Netherlands,  the  racial  diversities  of  the 
Flemings  and  the  Walloons  were  not 
much  considered.  Consequently,  the 
new  state  was  from  its  inception  left  to 
wrestle  with  the  always  deplorable  bilin- 
gual problems.  The  choice  of  a  reigning 
house  for  the  new  kingdom  was  not  even 
left  to  Belgium,  but  was  dictated  by  the 
great  powers.  The  choice  of  the  English 
queen's  uncle  as  the  first  sovereign  was 
agreeable  to  England,  and  the  arrange- 
ment for  his  speedy  marriage  to  the 
daughter  of  Louis  Philippe,  then  King 


28     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

of  France,  was  most  pleasing  to  France, 
as  the  future  dynasty  was  not  likely  to 
be  hostile  to  French  susceptibilities. 

It  will  thus  be  perceived  that  Belgium 
was  allowed  to  enter  the  family  of  na- 
tions only  provisionally  and  because  the 
great  powers  deemed  it  the  best  solution 
of  a  very  dangerous  territorial  problem. 
From  the  days  of  CaBsar  to  those  of  Na- 
poleon, the  valley  of  the  Meuse  has  been 
the  pathway  and  the  battle-field  of  all 
the  armies  of  Europe.  In  1830  neither 
France  nor  England  was  willing  that 
either  separately  should  have  para- 
mountcy  in  the  territory  since  known  as 
Belgium.  In  1830  an  English  foothold 
in  the  Low  Countries  would  have  met  the 
opposition  of  all  the  other  great  powers. 
At  that  time  Prussia  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  enforce  its  own  views  in  regard  to 
the  territory  now  called  Belgium.  It 
very  reluctantly  consented  to  the  propo- 


! 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    29 

sals  of  England  and  France  to  sever  it 
from  Holland,  as  did  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia; but  all  the  powers  recognized  that 
England's  interest  in  the  Belgian  littoral 
was  greatest.  Indeed,  her  interest  was 
vital.  England  has  long  feared  that  the 
littoral  of  the  Low  Countries  might  pass 
into  powerful  and  unfriendly  hands,  and 
the  supreme  effort  of  her  statesmen  has 
been  directed  to  frustrating  this  eventu- 
ality. That  her  apprehension  is  both 
legitimate  and  natural  cannot  be  denied. 
Her  bitter  enemy,  Napoleon  the  Great, 
discerned  that  "Antwerp  was  a  pistol 
turned  against  the  heart  of  England." 
What  he  neglected  to  add  was  that  Bel- 
gian territory  is  a  highway  which  leads 
with  equal  directness  to  either  Paris  or 
Berlin. 

The  terrain  of  both  Belgium  and  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  is  very  un- 
fortunately situated  as  regards  three  of 


30     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

the  great  powers  of  Europe.  The  pres- 
ent German  invasion  of  these  territories 
is  by  no  means  the  first  instance  of  a  vio- 
lation by  the  powers;  it  is  computed  by 
competent  authority  to  be  the  one  hun- 
dred and  nineteenth  invasion.  For  this 
reason  Belgium  has  been  called  the 
"Cockpit  of  Europe."  Every  military 
scientist  in  Europe  has  long  formulated 
possible  plans  for  military  movements 
on  Belgian  territory,  as  the  military  ar- 
chives of  all  the  great  powers  might  dis- 
close. 

The  international  situation  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  and  of  Bel- 
gium is  almost  identical.  If  anything, 
Luxemburg  was  more  effectually  neu- 
tralized than  Belgium.  A  public  man  is 
in  no  position  to  form  a  correct  opinion 
upon  the  international  status  of  Belgium 
and  the  obligations  of  the  guarantors  of 
its  neutralization  if  he  is  not  entirely 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBUEG    31 

familiar  with  the  Luxemburg  neutraliza- 
tion treaties  of  1839  and  1867,  their  con- 
struction by  the  great  powers,  and  the 
subsequent  attitude  of  the  signatories  to 
such  treaties.  The  international  status 
of  Belgium  was  fixed  by  Articles  VII 
and  XXV  of  the  treaties  of  November 
15,  1831,  and  by  Articles  I  and  II  of  the 
treaty  of  April  19,  1839.  The  neutrali- 
zation of  Luxemburg  was  finally  effected 
by  the  treaty  of  London,  signed  May  11, 
1867,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  Italy,  Eussia,  and  Prussia.  By 
Article  II  of  that  treaty  the  ''high  con- 
tracting parties  engaged  to  respect  the 
principle  of  neutrality  stipulated  by  the 
present  Article."  By  the  prior  treaty 
of  1839  the  powers  collectively  guar- 
anteed the  peaceful  possession  of  Lux- 
emburg to  the  King  of  Holland  in  the 
fullest,  most  absolute,  and  most  unquali- 
fied manner.    The  object  of  the  Luxem- 


32    AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

burg  treaty  was  to  prevent  the  possibil- 
ity of  Luxemburg  passing  under  the 
control  of  any  of  the  great  powers.  The 
effect  of  the  treaty  of  1839  was  to 
make  Luxemburg  inalienable.  The  Eng- 
lish construction  of  her  obligations  un- 
der the  treaty  of  1839  concerning  the 
practical  neutralization  of  Luxemburg 
was  not,  however,  fortunate  for  Belgium 
in  1914.  On  the  threshold  of  the  exist- 
ing hostilities,  as  appears  from  that 
most  important  document,  the  ''British 
White  Book,"  published  in  England  by 
authority  in  the  first  days  of  the  pres- 
ent war,  M.  Cambon,  the  French  am- 
bassador, asked  the  English  foreign 
minister.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  ''what  the 
British  Government  thinks  of  the  viola- 
tion of  Luxemburg  by  the  Germans." 
Sir  Edward  Grey  referred  him  "to  the 
views  expressed  in  1867  by  Lord  Derby 
and  Lord  Clarendon."     (White   Book, 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    33 

No.  148).  Sir  Edward's  answer  in- 
volves a  historical  retrospect.  In  1867 
France,  prior  to  the  final  treaty  of  that 
year,  was  negotiating  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg. 
This  expressely  violated  the  treaty  of 
1839,  on  which  Prussia  relied.  In  Par- 
liament Sir  Robert  Peel  strongly  pro- 
tested against  the  purchase  of  Luxem- 
burg by  France,  following  closely  the 
annexation  of  Savoy  and  Nice,  ''be- 
cause the  holding  of  Luxemburg  is  a  mat- 
ter of  first  importance  for  France,  for 
defensive  or  offensive  operations  against 
Germany."  The  question  in  substance 
in  1867,  when  France  was  in  treaty  for 
Luxemburg,  really  was.  What  obliga- 
tions the  collective  guarantee  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  territory  of  Luxemburg 
entailed  on  the  signatory  powers,  and 
whether,  if  one  power  disregarded  or  re- 
tired from  the  treaty,  the  others  were 


34     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

obligated  either  individually  or  jointly  to 
enforce  by  arms  the  obligations  of  the 
treaty  ?  Prussia  insisted  on  the  binding 
nature  of  the  obligation,  as  it  was  clearly 
her  interest  to  do  then.  Count  Bis- 
marck was  firm  on  this  point.  On  June 
14,  1867,  according  to  Hansard  (p.  1910, 
seq.),  Mr.  Labouchere,  M.  P.,  in  the 
course  of  Parliamentary  debate  on  the 
treaty  of  1839  said: 

.  .  .  The  guarantees  entered  into  by  this 
country  for  the  independence  of  Belgium  and 
of  Turkey  stood  on  very  different  ground 
from  that  given  recently  with  respect  to 
Luxemburg.  Nobody  could  contend  that  the 
possession  of  Luxemburg,  either  by  Prance 
or  Germany,  would  menace  or  disturb  our 
interests. 


At  the  time  when  a  war  with  America 
seemed  likely,  we  might  have  felt  grateful  to 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  for  stepping  for- 
ward  with   a   guarantee    affecting   Montreal 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    35 

and  the  Canadian  lakes;  but  would  his  own 
subjects  have  been  pleased? 

According  to  M.  Moustier,  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  France,  the  ''neutrality"  of  Lux- 
emburg might  not  be  inconsistent  with  the 
passage  of  troops  through  the  Duchy.  The 
noble  Lord  appeared  to  have  admitted  that 
a  violation  of  the  treaty  would  be  constituted 
if  an  army  marched  through  the  territory, 
but  a  glance  at  the  map  would  show  that  it 
was  almost  impossible  that  war  could  be 
waged  between  France  and  Germany  with- 
out an  army  passing  through  the  Luxemburg 
territory.  If,  therefore,  we  were  to  take 
Count  Bismarck's  view  of  our  obligations,  we 
should  be  bound  to  go  to  war.  Nothing  had 
done  so  miicJi  harm  to  the  English  name  as  a 
certain  recklessness  in  undertaking  ohliga- 
tions  and  a  great  discretion  in  fulfilling 
them.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  Even  supposing  that  England  might 
be  brought  to  raise  armies  and  find  treasure 
for  a  war  to  prevent  a  Dutch  province  from 
becoming  German  or  French,  was  it  likely 
that  our  colonies  would  incur  the  risks  of  war 
for  such  an  object? 


36     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

The  nature  of  the  obligation  of  the 
powers  under  the  Luxemburg  guarantee 
of  1839  was  in  1869  a  subject  of  deep  con- 
cern both  in  England  and  on  the  Conti- 
nent. Prussia  was  particularly  appre- 
hensive. Nevertheless,  Lord  Stanley, 
then  English  foreign  secretary,  in- 
formed Prussia:  *'No  interest  of  ours 
was  either  directly  or  indirectly  involved 
and  we  stood  absolutely  free  and  un- 
fettered. The  security  of  Belgium  is 
an  entirely  different  matter."  (Han- 
sard, Vol.  CLXXXVL,  p.  1253,  seq.) 

Now,  Great  Britain  was  a  party  to  the 
neutralization  of  Luxemburg.  Lord 
John  Russell,  not  then  in  power,  alone 
protested  against  any  such  narrow  con- 
struction of  the  obligation  of  England 
under  the  treaty  of  1839,  and  he  bravely 
stated  that  the  position  of  the  English 
Government  had  created  a  very  un- 
pleasant    feeling     on     the     Continent. 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    37 

(Hansard,  Vol.  CLXXXVIIL,  p.  975.) 
The  relation  of  Saguntum  to  the  Car- 
thaginians was  singularly  like  Belgium's 
to  Germany.  The  Roman  contentions 
concerning  Hannibal's  violation  of  the 
treaty  relative  to  Saguntum  probably 
offer  the  nearest  parallel  to  England's 
present  contentions  concerning  the  Ger- 
man invasion  of  Belgium  in  derogation 
of  the  Belgian  treaty  of  1831.  In  the 
negotiations  for  peace  the  Roman  argu- 
ment is  not  likely  to  be  overlooked  by 
those  trained  in  the  art  of  diplomacy. 

The  attitude  of  the  powers  to  the  Lux- 
emburg treaties  leaves  the  impression 
that  the  right  of  a  signatory  to  contra- 
vene or  to  withdraw  from  its  conven- 
tional guaranty  is  not  clearly  denied  in 
public  law.  The  alleged  right  of  a  signa- 
tory to  violate  the  pact  is  a  grave  mat- 
ter, and  it  certainly  shocks  the  moral 
sense  of  private  people  when  a  party  to 


38     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

a  neutralization  treaty  withdraws  and 
then  violates  it.  But  the  nature  and  ex- 
tent of  the  obligation  of  a  guarantor  of 
neutrality  is,  in  international  law,  not  so 
clearly  laid  down  as  it  should  be.  The 
English  position  that  there  was  no  obli- 
gation of  the  parties  to  the  Luxemburg 
treaty  to  enforce  it  by  a  resort  to  arms, 
unless  their  own  interests  were  also  vio- 
lated, leaves  a  very  unpleasant  impres- 
sion when  applied  to  Belgium.  That  a 
treaty  of  neutralization  was  violated 
with  impunity  in  the  instance  of  Luxem- 
burg must  be  conceded,  and  this  is  the 
unhappy  lesson  of  Luxemburg.  The  un- 
certainty of  the  attitude  of  the  great 
powers  in  regard  to  neutralization  trea- 
ties long  stared  Belgium  in  the  face,  and 
consequently  its  apprehensions  were  first 
directed  to  one  great  power  and  then  to 
another.  The  annexation  of  Korea  by 
Japan  in  1910,  with  the  consent  of  the 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    39 

powers,  after  Japan  had  guaranteed  the 
independence  of  Korea  in  1904,  was  om- 
inous for  Belgium. 

If  the  often-avowed  projects  for  the 
neutralization  of  either  Mexico  or  Can- 
ada by  the  great  powers  ever  come  to 
maturity,  America  will  then  be  con- 
fronted by  a  set  of  problems  concerning 
neutralized  countries  of  the  gravest  im- 
portance to  her  own  internal  safety  and 
security.  It  is  highly  desirable,  there- 
fore, that  the  status  of  neutralized  coun- 
tries and  the  nature  of  the  obligations 
of  the  guarantors  of  neutrality  should 
receive  a  closer  consideration  than  they 
yet  have  received  in  the  law  of  nations. 
A  neutralized  state  may,  in  some  of  its 
aspects,  yet  prove  embarrassing  for 
America.  In  late  public  utterances  of 
many  leading  Americans  regarding  neu- 
tralized countries  there  seem  to  be  cer- 
tain assumptions  quite  inadmissible  in 


40    AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

respect  to  a  Canada  or  a  Mexico  neutral- 
ized by  the  powers.  Had  the  former 
Republic  of  Texas  been  neutralized,  as 
once  proposed,  or  had  California  been 
ceded  to  Great  Britain  by  Mexico,  as 
once  attempted,  the  intricacy  of  the  law 
of  neutralization  would  now  be  more 
apparent  to  Americans.  If  the  United 
States  had  joined  in  the  proposed  neu- 
tralization of  the  former  Republic  of 
Texas  by  England  and  France,  would  it 
then  have  been  at  liberty  to  recede  from 
the  treaty  when  Texas  itself  desired  to 
be  annexed  to  the  United  States?  If 
the  United  States  first  had  denounced 
such  a  treaty  and  declined  to  engage  in 
it  further,  would  France  and  England 
then  have  been  obligated  to  enforce  the 
neutralization  of  the  Republic  of  Texas 
by  a  recourse  to  arms?  Such  are  the 
serious  questions  which  a  treaty  of  neu- 
tralization presents. 


BELGIUM  AND  LUXEMBURG    41 

According  to  the  British  ''White 
Book,"  on  the  first  signs  of  the  great 
conflict  of  1914  Sir  Edward  Grey  offi- 
cially inquired  in  Paris  and  Berlin 
whether  the  French  and  German  gov- 
ernments are  ''prepared  to  engage  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long 
as  no  other  power  violates  it."  (114.) 
The  German  chancellor  replied  that  Ger- 
many would  like  to  know  what  France 
is  prepared  to  do.  (122).)  The  reply 
from  Paris  was  "that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment are  resolved  to  respect  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  unless  some  other 
power  violated  it."  (125.)  On  August 
1,  1914,  the  German  ambassador  at  Lon- 
don asked  Sir  Edward  Grey  whether,  if 
Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate 
Belgian  neutrality,  England  would  en- 
gage to  remain  neutral.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  did  not  think  "we  could  give  a 
promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition 


42     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

alone."  (123.)  The  German  ambas- 
sador then  suggested  that  the  integrity 
of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be 
guaranteed  by  Germany.  No  definite 
reply  was  vouchsafed.  England  simply 
refused  to  be  bound.  Evidently  the 
great  war  of  the  empires,  long  predicted, 
was  at  hand,  if  all  the  conditions  favored 
it.  In  that  event  Belgium  was  left  in  a 
very  perilous  position,  for  every  military 
expert  in  Europe  had  announced  that  its 
territory  would  inevitably  be  a  battle- 
field of  the  warring  powers. 


CHAPTER  in 

THE   BAL.KANS 

That  the  War  of  1914  could  be  con- 
fined to  the  Balkans  no  profound  Eng- 
lish statesman  could  have  believed;  yet 
the  early  efforts  of  both  England  and 
Germany  in  1914  were  apparently  di- 
rected to  that  end  alone.  Had  the  war 
been  so  confined,  it  would  have  been  sat- 
isfactory only  to  Austria-Hungary.  It 
must  have  been  known  in  England  from 
the  first  menace  of  hostilities  against 
Serbia  by  Austria-Hungary  that  in  any 
such  conflict  Serbia  would  not  be  aban- 
doned by  Russia.  The  Balkan  history 
of  the  last  half  of  the  century  preceding 
demonstrated    that    Russia    could    not 

43 


44    AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

abandon  the  Slavs  to  Austrian  domina- 
tion. That  Germany  would  stand  by 
Austria-Hungary  as  against  Russia  was 
equally  clear.  The  French  ambassadors 
in  London  and  St.  Petersburg  most 
frankly  stated  ''that  France  would  ad- 
here to  Russia  at  every  step."  (White 
Book,  No.  6.)  The  only  possibility  of 
preventing  the  extension  of  the  Balkan 
war  to  all  Europe  was  that  England 
should  promptly  declare  its  intention  to 
stand  with  France  and  Russia  in  the 
event  of  a  European  war.  If  England 
so  declared,  she  was  advised  by  Russia, 
France,  and  Italy  that  a  general  Eu- 
ropean war  involving  all  the  great  pow- 
ers could  be  avoided.  This  is  proved 
by  the  official  documents  contained  in  the 
British  White  Book  of  1914.  The  Rus- 
sian foreign  minister,  M.  Sazonoff,  in 
July,  1914,  stated  to  the  English  rep- 
resentative  in   St.   Petersburg  that  if 


THE  BALKANS  45 

England  ''took  her  stand  with  France 
and  Russia,  there  would  be  no  war,"  but 
that  if  England  ''failed  them  now, 
rivers  of  blood  would  flow,"  and  Eng- 
land "would  in  the  end  be  dragged 
in."  (No.  17.)  On  July  27  the  Russian 
ambassador  in  London  deplored  the  ef- 
fect of  the  impression  that  England 
would  stand  aside.  (No.  47.)  M.  Pale- 
ologue,  the  French  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  urged  England  to  the  same 
effect.  On  July  29  the  Marquis  of  San 
Giuliano  gave  to  the  British  ambassador 
Italy's  opinion,  "If  Germany  believed 
that  Great  Britain  would  act  with  Russia 
and  France,  it  would  have  a  great  ef- 
fect." (No.  80.)  President  Poincare 
in  behalf  of  France,  on  July  30,  1914, 
stated  to  the  British  ambassador  at 
Paris,  "if  his  Majesty's  Government  an- 
nounced that  England  would  come  to  the 
aid  of  France  in  the  result  of  a  conflict 


46     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

.  .  .  there  would  be  no  war."  (No.  99.) 
President  Poincare  reiterated  this  in  his 
letter  to  King  George  V  of  England, 
dated  July  31,  1914.  But  England  did 
not,  or  could  not  for  some  reason,  act. 
It  seems  now  as  if  a  titanic  struggle  in 
Europe  was  fated  by  errors  of  policy 
from  the  beginning,  and  that  it  was  be- 
yond the  powers  of  the  statesmen  of  any 
single  country  to  prevent  the  dire  calam- 
ity. The  apprehensions,  the  fears,  and 
the  rival  ambitions  of  the  nations  of  Eu- 
rope all  tended  to  make  a  general  war 
inevitable  when  the  Balkan  fires  were 
relighted  in  1914. 

The  preliminary  transactions  between 
the  powers  in  July  and  August,  1914, 
when  the  war  between  Austria  and  Ser- 
bia loomed  up,  are  contained  in  the  Brit- 
ish White  Book.  On  July  24,  1914,  the 
French  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg 
gave  the  British  ambassador  to  under- 


THE  BALKANS  47 

stand  ' '  that  France  would  fulfill  all  their 
obligations  entailed  by  her  alliance  with 
Russia,  if  necessity  arose,  besides  sup- 
porting Russia  strongly  in  any  diplo- 
matic negotiations. ' '  ( No.  6. )  On  July 
29, 1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey  communicated 
to  Sir  Francis  Bertie  in  Paris  that  the 
Balkan  war  '*  would  then  be  a  question 
of  the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav — 
a  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Balkans ; 
and  our  idea  had  always  been  to  avoid 
being  drawn  into  a  war  over  a  Balkan 
question."  (No.  87.)  The  British  am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  had  previ- 
ously stated  to  the  French  ambassador 
that  '*  direct  British  interests  in  Serbia 
were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of  that 
country  would  never  be  sanctioned  by 
British  public  opinion."     (No.  6.) 

That  the  British  interests  in  the  Bal- 
kans were  not  **nil,"  England  knew,  and 
it  is  now  apparent  to  the  world  that  Eng- 


48     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

lish  interests  in  Serbia  are  not  nil.  Had 
Russia  been  triumphant  and  Austria- 
Hungary  effaced,  a  great  Slav  power  un- 
der the  hegemony  of  Russia  would  have 
been  erected  in  the  Balkans.  This 
would  have  been  most  disturbing  to  Eng- 
lish susceptibilities,  and  to  Great  Brit- 
ain's interests  in  Asia  and  Africa. 
Since  the  war  began  it  has  been  correctly 
stated  in  England  by  an  English  subject, 
who  has  devoted  much  critical  attention 
to  the  "Eastern  questions,"  that  in  the 
event  of  Russia 's  triumph  in  the  Balkans 
English  imperialists  would  have  been 
obliged  to  promote  the  military  strength 
of  the  German  Empire  as  a  counterpoise 
to  the  dreaded  Russian  ascendency. 
Now  that  the  Central  powers  are  for  the 
moment  in  practical  control  of  the  Bal- 
kans, the  danger  of  the  Balkans  to  Eng- 
lish interests  is  no  longer  concealed  in 
England.     The  Balkan  question  is,  in 


THE  BALKANS  49 

fact,  an  ominous  spectre  in  all  intelli- 
gent governmental  circles  in  England, 
for  in  it  are  involved  many  future  perils 
to  the  different  powers,  but  most  directly 
of  all  to  the  extended  English  Empire. 

The  Austria-Hungary  war  of  1914 
against  Serbia  was  *'the  postponed  se- 
quel of  the  war  of  1912."  That  Ger- 
many would  aid  Austria  against  Eussia 
was  certain.  Ever  since  the  days  of 
Frederick  II  of  Prussia  the  inhabitants 
of  Germany  have  been  in  fear  of  Rus- 
sian invasion.  It  was  to  prevent  the 
overweening  growth  of  Russia  that  oc- 
casioned the  first  partition  of  Poland. 
It  was  a  national  fear  of  Russia  in  Ger- 
many which  in  the  end  mobilized  even  the 
Social  Democrats  behind  German  diplo- 
macy in  the  present  Great  War,  (Eng- 
lish '* Contemporary  Review"  for  Sep- 
tember, 1914). 

The  Balkan  question  is  not  compli- 


50     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

cated.  When  the  Ottoman  Empire  had 
been  virtually  destroyed  in  Europe,  the 
Balkan  question  became  primarily  an 
issue  between  Austria  and  Russia  for  the 
hegemony  of  the  small  States  through 
which  led  most  directly  the  land  passages 
from  Europe  to  Asia,  Africa,  and  the 
seas  adjacent.  For  a  time  Russia  and 
Austria  worked  in  close  association  in 
the  Balkans.  Austria  was  allowed  pre- 
dominance in  Serbia  and  Russia  in  Bul- 
garia. It  was  when  Russian  diplomacy 
became  most  influential  in  Serbia  also 
that  the  general  European  peace  was 
first  threatened. 

At  this  fateful  epoch  in  the  world's 
history  the  most  immediate  of  all  the 
problems  of  the  moment  is,  What  will  be- 
come of  Russia,  Turkey,  and  the  Bal- 
kans? The  interest  of  America  in  this 
question  is  not  direct.  That  the  Balkan 
questions  should  be  intruded  at  all  into 


THE  BALKANS  51 

American  policies  is  highly  undesirable. 
There  are  indications  that  there  is  al- 
ready a  rift  in  the  entente  between  Amer- 
ica and  England  on  this  point.  Mr.  Bal- 
four significantly  announced  to  Parlia- 
ment, July  29  of  last  year,  ''America  had 
[has]  no  interest  on  the  Continent"  of 
Europe.  This  announcement  is  appa- 
rently not  in  accord  with  late  official  dec- 
larations at  Washington,  nor  is  it  con- 
sistent with  all  the  causes  officially  as- 
signed for  Americans  entrance  into  the 
European  War. 

With  proper  regard  to  the  future 
safety  of  the  United  States,  it  cannot  be 
conceded  that  it  is  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  promote  the  proposed 
neutralization  of  any  of  the  Balkan 
States,  under  some  guaranty  by  the 
great  powers,  to  be  contained  in  the  final 
treaty  of  peace  which  will  terminate  the 
present  general  war.    The  United  States 


52     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

has  no  national  interest  in  the  Balkans. 
Even  if  the  Balkan  States  should  urge 
the  United  States  to  become  a  party  to 
their  neutralization,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that 
it  will  decline. 

The  proximity  of  a  feeble  power  to  a 
great  one  makes  neutralization  guaran- 
ties highly  coveted  in  the  weaker  state. 
For  this  reason  it  has  been  suggested 
that  Canada  and  Mexico  should  ulti- 
mately be  neutralized  by  international 
guaranties  of  the  great  powers.  That 
any  such  neutralization  of  Canada  or 
Mexico  would  be  inimical  to  the  interests 
of  America  in  any  future  war  between 
the  United  States  and  a  great  European 
or  a  great  Asiatic  power,  military  men 
will  concede.  In  any  such  war  it  would 
be  indispensable  to  the  security  of  Amer- 
ica that  its  military  forces  should  imme- 
diately bar  any  approach  to  this  conti- 
nent through  the  open  doors  of  either 


THE  BALKANS  53 

Canada  or  Mexico.  While  Americans 
prize  liberty  in  the  abstract,  the  first  care 
of  their  Government  should  be  the  lib- 
erty of  Americans,  and  not  that  of  some 
remote  people  alien  to  them  in  blood  and 
institutions.  It  was  some  such  reason 
in  all  probability  which  induced  the  as- 
tute English  statesmen  to  refrain  from 
taking  a  final  position  in  regard  to  the 
true  construction  of  the  Luxemburg 
treaties  already  mentioned. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   SEQUEL   OF   THE   WAB 

When  the  present  Great  War  shall 
have  subsided,  how  will  Araerica  stand 
in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  world?  In 
what  way  will  her  peculiar  interests  be 
affected  by  the  possible  international  ar- 
rangements which  will  in  the  usual 
course  conclude  the  war?  These  are 
now  questions  of  more  than  ordinary 
moment  to  the  future  peace  and  pros- 
perity of  America.  No  doubt  the  ques- 
tions themselves  are  receiving  the  anx- 
ious consideration  of  the  present  Gov- 
ernment. 

The  interests  of  America  most  con- 
cerned in  the  final  treaties  which  will 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  THE  WAR    55 

embody  the  consummation  of  this  great- 
est of  modern  wars  may  be  classified  as 
(1)  Mexican,  (2)  Canadian,  (3)  West 
Indian,  (4)  Asiatic,  and  Pacific.  Cur- 
sory suggestions  in  regard  to  each  of 
these  interests  are  contained  in  these  ar- 
ticles. It  is  not  pretended  that  they  are 
other  than  tentative;  but  it  is  thought 
that  at  this  important  moment  the  sug- 
gestions, such  as  they  are,  may  serve  to 
stimulate  their  better  discussion. 

To  some  extent  the  interests  indicated 
must  be  affected  by  the  outcome  of  the 
present  World  War.  That  at  the  end  of 
the  war  the  alliance  between  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  and  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire will  not  be  disrupted  is  most  prob- 
able. It  is  a  natural  alliance  dictated 
by  the  interests  of  the  German  Empire, 
Austria,  and  Turkey.  The  alliance 
ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  offensive  to 
America.    Nor  is  its  continuation  hostile 


56     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

to  the  best  interests  of  America,  for  in 
that  event  France,  England,  Italy,  and 
Japan  of  the  great  powers  will  necessar- 
ily be  interested  to  remain  in  very  close 
and  friendly  association  with  America. 
An  alliance  of  the  Central  powers  will 
make  the  continuation  of  the  ''Entente" 
highly  desirable  for  England,  France, 
Italy,  Japan,  and  America.  There  will 
thus  be  a  new  and  more  effective  ''bal- 
ance ' '  of  the  great  powers.  Such  an  as- 
sociation of  the  great  powers  must  tend 
to  the  advantage  of  America,  for  it  con- 
duces to  a  more  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  pressing  Mexican  and  Japanese 
problems  in  particular. 

At  the  moment  it  looks  as  if  Russia 
would  usurp  the  place  of  the  Balkans  in 
the  chancelleries  of  Europe.  If  Russia 
remains  intact,  and  a  stable  government 
of  all  the  Russias  comes  soon,  that  Rus- 
sia will  for  the  time  being  adhere  most 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  THE  WAR    57 

closely  to  France  and  America  seems 
probable.  But  the  Russian  situation  is 
not  reassuring.  That  a  permanent  form 
of  government  is  likely  to  arise  in  Russia 
within  a  decade  is  not  probable  unless 
the  monarchy  is  meanwhile  restored. 

What,  then,  is  to  become  of  the  vast 
Russian  domain  in  the  event  of  more  se- 
rious internal  commotions  is  with  rea- 
son troubling  every  statesman  in  every 
state  in  Europe.  For  a  long  time  to 
come  the  final  destiny  of  Russia  and  her 
Asiatic  provinces  must  necessarily  con- 
tinue to  usurp  the  most  important  place 
in  the  diplomacy  of  Europe.  If  Russia 
should  by  any  means  drift  back  to  her 
former  dynasty,  it  will  apparently  be  un- 
der a  modified  and  more  liberal  consti- 
tution. That  disorder  and  insecurity  of 
property  will  be  allowed  to  continue  in 
Russia  is  most  improbable.  In  time  the 
property  classes  and  the  intelligent  no- 


58     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

bility  of  Russia  will  doubtless  make  som© 
overt  effort  looking  to  a  reaction  and 
the  restoration  of  the  ancient  and  his- 
toric monarchy.  Should  the  monarchy 
be  restored  with  the  consent  of  the  Rus- 
sians, America  will  have  little  to  appre- 
hend. The  ancient  dynasty  of  Russia 
has  exhibited  the  greatest  friendliness 
to  America  and  in  the  most  critical  mo- 
ments of  American  history.  It  is  to  this 
friendship  that  America  owes  the 
princely  domain  of  Alaska  and  its  de- 
pendencies. It  was  not  advantageous  to 
Canada  or  the  English  interests  that 
Alaska  should  pass  to  America,  but  the 
Russian  dynasty  ignored  their  opposi- 
tion and  ceded  Alaska  to  America. 
Such  friendly  generosity  on  the  part  of 
the  late  dynasty  and  its  conduct  in  the 
civil  war  of  1861-65  Americans  are  not 
likely  to  forget  when  the  American  prob- 
lems to  the  north  of  the  49th  degree  of 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  THE  WAR     59 

north  latitude  become  more  critical,  as 
they  necessarily  will  with  time. 

America  is  not  interested  in  imposing 
any  particular  form  of  government  on 
Russia.  With  the  internal  government 
of  any  country  in  Europe  America  has 
no  concern  so  long  as  American  institu- 
tions are  not  menaced  by  that  country. 
America  has  no  interest  in  the  forms  of 
government  adopted  by  European  coun- 
tries. Lloyd  George,  who  stands  pre- 
eminently for  the  democracy  of  England, 
has  very  recently  stated  that  such  was 
the  English  position  concerning  the  do- 
mestic institutions  of  all  foreign  coun- 
tries. Mr.  Balfour,  who  is  personally  a 
representative  of  a  very  different  class 
of  Englishmen,  the  professional  govern- 
ing aristocracy  of  England,  in  July  of 
last  year  officially  stated  that  "no  one 
was  foolish  enough  to  suppose  that  it 
would  be  possible  to  impose"  on  a  for- 


60     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

eign  country  '*a  constitution  made  out- 
side of  that  country."  He  very  prop- 
erly added  that  "nations  must  make 
their  scheme  of  liberty  for  themselves 
according  to  their  own  ideas  and  based 
on  their  history,  character,  and  hopes." 

This  statement  has  much  commended 
itself  to  the  intelligence  of  most  thought- 
ful Americans.  America  has  now  noth- 
ing to  fear  from  Germany  so  long  as 
England,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan  are 
not  estranged. 

The  present  entente  between  France 
and  England  is  likely  to  be  durable.  As 
the  French  ambassador,  M.  Cambon, 
said  in  London  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in 
July,  1914:  ''It  could  not  be  to  England's 
interest  that  France  should  be  crushed 
by  Germany.  Great  Britain  would  then 
be  in  a  very  diminished  position  with  re- 
gard to  Germany.  In  1870  Great  Brit- 
ain had  made  a  great  mistake  in  allow- 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  THE  WAR     61 

ing  an  enormous  increase  of  German 
strength.  ..."  (119.)  That  France 
should  continue  an  independent  and  un- 
diminished state  has  now  become  impor- 
tant to  English  security.  The  safety  of 
both  powers  is  seen  to  depend  in  the  fu- 
ture upon  their  entente.  Had  Russia,  by 
means  of  this  war,  assumed  the  hege- 
mony of  Europe,  and  had  France  contin- 
ued in  close  alliance  with  her  on  all 
Eastern  questions,  the  English  under- 
standing with  France  might  speedily 
have  been  jeoparded;  but  no  such  con- 
dition is  now  likely  to  ensue  within 
any  reasonable  space  of  time.  There- 
fore the  continued  entente  between 
France  and  England  is  measurably  sure 
to  endure  for  a  considerable  space  after 
this  present  war  is  terminated. 

The  future  position  of  Russia  is  ad- 
mitted in  Europe  to  be  uncertain.  That 
Russia  will  be  reconstructed  ultimately 


62     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

on  the  ancient  plan  and  in  conformity 
with  the  principles  of  the  governments 
most  nearly  adjacent  to  her  is  generally 
regarded  in  Europe  as  the  most  natural 
solution.  In  Asia  the  future  of  Russia 
excites  apprehension.  Japan  would 
have  ground  for  alarm  if  the  naturally 
strong,  disciplined,  and  effectual  Ger- 
man system  were  by  any  chance  extended 
to  the  Pacific.  Japan  is  therefore  di- 
rectly interested  at  present  in  preserving 
a  good  understanding  with  all  the  En- 
tente powers,  including  America.  That 
this  entente  cordiale  will  conduce  to  the 
interests  of  America  is  apparent.  It  can 
be  destroyed  only  by  the  improbable  dis- 
ruption of  the  alliance  between  the  Cen- 
tral powers  of  Europe. 

The  problems  of  America  after  the 
war  will  not  be  confined  to  foreign  af- 
fairs. The  inevitable  increase  in  taxa- 
tion by  the  Federal  Government,  the 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  THE  WAR     G3 

probable  rapid  diminution  in  the  remu- 
neration of  labor,  and  the  increased  cost 
of  living  due  to  the  war  will  doubtless 
create  popular  unrest  such  as  has  never 
before  been  known  in  America.  That 
the  Government  will  prove  equal  to  the 
maintenance  of  order  there  is  no  reason 
from  its  past  history  to  doubt.  The  at- 
tachment of  Americans  to  their  familiar 
institutions  is  so  great  that  mere  adver- 
sity or  misfortune  alone  will  not  cause 
them  to  change  their  institutions.  The 
perpetuation  of  the  republic  in  America 
is  for  a  long  period  as  certain  as  any 
human  institution  of  government  can  be, 
but  the  need  for  fostering  the  interests 
already  indicated  will  be  made  apparent 
to  the  Government  when  the  period  of 
unrest  becomes  acute. 


CHAPTER  V 

MEXICO 

Afteb  the  general  peace  ending  the 
present  Great  War  the  American  Gov- 
ernment will  be  compelled  to  pay  closer 
attention  to  the  disturbed  state  of  Mex- 
ico. The  great  increase  of  America's 
national  debt,  her  increased  taxation, 
and  the  artificial  limitations  placed  on 
her  ability  to  cope  with  either  England 
or  Germany  in  world  commerce  will  com- 
pel America  to  promote  better  condi- 
tions of  trade  and  intercourse  on  her  own 
continent.  To  this  end  Mexico  must  be 
pacified  and  the  Government  made  more 
stable.  Stability  and  security  are  press- 
ing  needs    not    only    of    the    property 

64 


MEXICO  65 

classes  in  Mexico,  but  of  the  Mexican  la- 
borers as  well.  Without  prosperity  in 
Mexico,  humanitarians  should  clearly 
understand,  the  condition  of  its  lower 
classes  cannot  be  ameliorated.  More- 
over, the  safety  and  the  freedom  of 
Americans'  trade  is  directly  involved  in 
the  Mexican  problem.  After  the  gen- 
eral peace  the  American  Government 
will  not  long  be  suffered  to  continue  a 
policy  of  inaction  and  indifference  to 
the  internal  conditions  of  Mexico. 

Other  and  more  peremptory  motives 
will  ultimately  lead  America  to  a  re- 
vision of  its  policy  of  inaction.  No 
scheme  of  defensive  warfare  which 
omits  a  reference  to  Mexico  can  be  com- 
plete for  the  United  States  of  America. 
The  northern  boundary  of  Mexico,  as 
fixed  by  the  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hi- 
dalgo in  1848  and  the  Gadsden  Treaty 
of  1853,  extends  along  the  southern  fron- 


66     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

tier  of  the  United  States  for  nearly  2000 
miles.  The  occupation  of  Mexico  by  a 
European  or  Asiatic  power  of  the  first 
rank  at  war  with  the  United  States 
doubtless  would  and  should  be  pre- 
vented. At  the  first  sign  of  such  a  pos- 
sibility the  seaports  of  Mexico  would  be 
a  subject  of  serious  consideration  by  the 
military  authorities  of  the  United  States. 
That  Mexican  ports  should  not  offer  a 
harbor  for  the  enemy  would  be  a  mat- 
ter of  as  much  concern  in  Washington 
as  that  the  harbors  of  the  Chesapeake 
or  of  San  Diego  and  San  Francisco  Bay 
should  not  offer  them  a  safe  landing. 
If  Mexico  were  then  neutralized,  the 
neutrality  of  Mexico  would  inevitably 
be  subordinated  to  considerations  in- 
volving the  safety  and  the  integrity  of  a 
great  and  populous  nation.  America 
has  a  high  and  commendable  moral  con- 
ception of  the  effect  of  a  country's  neu- 


MEXICO  67 

tralization,  but  in  the  last  resort  it  can- 
not deliberately  permit  itself  to  be  de- 
stroyed. The  world  would  not  expect 
that  America  would  allow  itself  to  be 
overrun  from  Mexico. 

It  is  not  only  the  military  significance 
of  Mexico  which  makes  it  of  serious  im- 
portance to  the  United  States,  but  its 
trade,  and  the  unlimited  possibilities  of 
its  greater  development  under  a  stable 
Government.  Properly  governed,  Mexi- 
can commerce  with  its  nearest  neighbor, 
the  United  States,  would  be  of  incalcu- 
lable value  not  only  to  the  Mexicans 
themselves,  but  to  America.  The  fertile 
areas,  the  valuable  mines,  and  the  un- 
limited resources  of  Mexico  would,  if 
properly  developed  under  a  competent 
and  orderly  Government,  add  prodi- 
giously to  the  riches  and  the  foreign 
trade  of  the  United  States.  The  config- 
uration of  Mexico  in  reference  to  the 


68     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

United  States  makes  it  certain  that  Mex- 
ico and  the  United  States  are  destined  to 
some  closer  commercial  association  and 
some  defensive  alliance.  Had  the  momi- 
tain  chains  of  North  America  run  east 
and  west  instead  of  north  and  south,  the 
future  history  of  the  countries,  now  un- 
der separate  and  distinct  governments, 
would  be  very  different  from  what  it  is 
destined  to  be.  The  configuration  of  the 
territory  of  a  nation  with  reference  to 
that  of  bordering  nations  is  a  most  im- 
portant factor  in  both  its  economic  and 
its  political  development.  We  have  only 
to  glance  at  the  histories  of  Greece  and 
Italy  to  be  convinced  of  the  truth  of  this 
statement. 

The  history  of  Mexico  since  its  escape 
from  Spanish  domination  in  1821  shows 
a  lamentable  defect  in  the  capacity  of 
Mexicans  for  self-government.  Since  its 
virtual  independence  of  Spain,  with  the 


MEXICO  69 

exception  of  the  regime  of  Porfirio  Diaz 
from  1884  to  1911,  the  history  of  Mexico 
is  a  tale  of  almost  continuous  warfare, 
in  which  Maximilian's  empire  is  a  mere 
episode.  During  all  this  long  period  life 
and  property  have  been  insecure,  and  the 
misgovernment  such  as  no  neighboring 
power  of  the  first  rank  other  than  the 
United  States  would  have  suffered  to 
endure  so  long  in  any  country  contigu- 
ous to  it.  Instead  of  receiving  commen- 
dation for  its  toleration  of  Mexico 's  mis- 
government,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  been  censured  by  all 
the  older  political  communities  of  Eu- 
rope. That  the  Washington  Govern- 
ment is  largely  responsible  for  the  dis- 
order of  Mexico  is  believed  in  Europe. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  prevents  any  for- 
eign nation  taking  the  place  of  Spain  in 
Mexico,  and  it  morally  obligates  the 
United  States  to  do  that  which  it  will 


70     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

not  permit  any  foreign  Government  to 
do.  Unless  something  is  soon  done  by 
America  to  set  the  Mexican  house  in  or- 
der, it  is  reasonably  sure  that  some  sort 
of  foreign  intervention  will  be  suggested 
at  no  distant  time  after  the  general 
peace.  European  activities  in  this  hem- 
isphere will  not  subside  with  the  general 
peace.  They  can  be  regulated  only  by 
the  prompt  action  of  America  in  the  in- 
terest of  tranquillity  in  Mexico. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  the  Washing- 
ton Government  to  bring  about  a  better 
state  of  things  in  Mexico.  Nor  need  the 
exercise  of  this  power  imperil  the  inde- 
pendence of  Mexico.  This  would  be  de- 
plored in  America.  The  hegemony  of 
the  United  States  in  North  America  can, 
if  desired,  be  asserted  as  effectually  in 
Mexico  as  in  Cuba,  and  with  as  favorable 
results.  It  is  the  conviction  of  any  real 
necessity  for  action  which  has  been  lack- 


MEXICO  71 

ing  at  Washington,  and  it  is  the  want  of 
conviction  which  is  receiving  the  censure 
of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  Govern- 
ment at  Washington  is  constituted  for 
the  purpose  of  promoting  the  safety  and 
the  highest  development  of  the  United 
States.  The  Government  cannot  always 
wait  for  popular  mandates  concerning 
every  detail  of  its  foreign  policies.  The 
people  expect  their  Government  to  gov- 
ern and  they  have  a  right  to  expect  that 
it  will  govern  well.  As  yet  the  great 
mass  of  Americans  have  not  seen  fit  to 
intrude  their  opinions  on  the  Mexican 
question;  but  this  state  of  things  is  un- 
likely to  last. 

Ignoring  the  defects  of  the  Spanish 
administration  of  three  centuries,  it 
must  be  conceded  that  the  great  and  in- 
teresting cities  of  Mexico  were  founded 
under  Spanish  rule.  The  admirable  ar- 
chitecture of  Mexico,  which  bids  fair  to 


72     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

be  influential  in  the  future  of  Califor- 
nia from  San  Diego  to  San  Francisco,  is 
also  due  to  Spain.  Any  permanent  ex- 
cellence in  the  laws  of  Mexico  is  derived 
from  Spain. 

It  has  been  lately  remarked  in  an  in- 
fluential American  journal  that  the 
population  of  Mexico,  like  that  of  other 
countries,  is  composed  of  three  classes, 
''upper,  middle,  and  low"  (''Tragic 
Story  of  Martyred  Mexico").  Under 
Spain  the  upper  class  of  Mexicans  was 
perhaps  more  highly  refined  than  that 
of  any  other  part  of  North  America. 
He  who  would  have  a  correct  idea  of  high 
society  in  Mexico  a  century  since  must 
turn  to  the  pages  of  Mme.  Calderon  de 
la  Barca,  the  wife  of  the  first  Spanish 
minister  accredited  to  Mexico  after  its 
independence  ("Life  in  Mexico").  It 
is  a  document  of  no  little  value,  published 
at  the  instance  of  the  historian  Prescott. 


MEXICO  73 

At  the  present  day  the  general  refine- 
ment of  the  upper  class  of  Mexico  re- 
mains quite  equal  to  that  of  the  more  in- 
telligent classes  of  the  United  States. 
This  fact  Americans  are  apt  to  ignore. 
Few  Americans  who  adventure  into  Mex- 
ico come  to  know  the  inner  life  of  the 
Mexicans. 

It  is  the  orderly  upper  class  of  Mexico 
who  would  most  welcome  the  security 
which  the  United  States  is  alone  able  to 
afford  to  Mexico.  That  the  life  of  the 
lower  classes  of  Mexicans,  the  Indians 
and  the  mestizos,  could  be  ameliorated 
by  the  friendly  and  proper  intervention 
of  the  United  States  there  can  be  no 
question.  That  the  present  state  of 
things  in  Mexico  will  be  allowed  by 
America  to  continue  indefinitely  it  is 
counter  to  the  course  of  history  to  sup- 
pose. It  is  the  duty  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  to  undertake  the 


74    AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

pacification  and  reorganization  of  Mex- 
ico very  soon  after  the  general  peace, 
and  to  see  to  it  that  there  is  set  up  in  that 
unfortunate  and  superlatively  beautiful 
country,  close  to  the  United  States,  a 
Government  worthy  of  its  potentialities. 
It  is  only  in  this  way  that  the  United 
States  can  fulfil  on  this  continent  its 
natural  responsibilities  and  its  high  des- 
tiny. When  it  is  the  national  will  that 
peace  and  security  shall  be  brought  about 
in  Mexico  by  Washington,  it  can  be  ac- 
complished with  no  impairment  of  Mexi- 
can independence.  This  the  history  of 
American  intervention  in  Cuba  dem- 
onstrates. That  intelligent  Americans 
would  deplore  the  loss  of  independence 
by  Mexico  is  certain.  Only  a  few  Amer- 
ican adventurers  desire  its  annexation 
by  the  United  States.  The  intelligent 
classes  of  America  recognize  clearly  the 
natural   limitations    imposed   by   their 


MEXICO  75 

form  of  government,  and  it  is  the  intel- 
ligent classes  of  all  countries  who  in  the 
end  frame  its  policies.  The  continua- 
tion of  an  independent,  but  a  more  or- 
derly and  safer,  Mexico  is  the  only  wish 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  at 
the  present  time. 

Under  the  auspices  of  a  patriotic  and 
eminent  American,  Archbishop  Ireland 
of  St.  Paul,  a  brief,  but  powerful,  picture 
of  the  degraded  political  conditions  long 
prevailing  in  Mexico  has  very  lately 
been  given  to  the  world.  The  sketch  of 
the  revolutionary  governments  since  the 
expulsion  of  Spain  is  concise  and  ac- 
curate. The  rapine,  the  murderous  con- 
duct, and  the  general  disorder  and 
insecurity  of  the  Mexico  of  a  century 
past  are  there  given  with  substantial  ac- 
curacy and  without  exaggeration.  It 
makes  a  sorry  picture. 

Constant  revolutions  in  Mexico  mean 


76     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

that  there  can  be  no  stability  either  in 
public  or  private  affairs.  The  insecu- 
rity of  the  property  of  American  nation- 
als in  Mexico  the  American  Government 
has  the  power  to  ignore;  but  no  great 
Government  can  persistently  neglect 
such  interests  without  condemnation  in 
the  end.  Action  will  follow  the  more 
spirited  condemnation  that  must  soon 
exhibit  itself  after  the  general  peace. 
In  view  of  the  established  foreign  policy 
of  America,  formulated  in  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  it  is  not  safe  for  America  to 
continue  to  ignore  the  Mexican  depreda- 
tions committed  against  foreign  subjects 
and  citizens.  America  must  either  act 
in  Mexico  or  allow  other  nations  to  in- 
tervene. There  is  no  third  choice  left  to 
her.  That  America  will  patiently  suffer 
foreign  intervention  in  Mexico  would  be 
counter  to  her  history.  Therefore  it  is 
reasonably    certain    that    the    Mexican 


MEXICO  77 

problem  will  be  taken  up  by  Washing- 
ton soon  after  the  next  general  peace. 

The  inconvenience  suffered  by  Amer- 
ican citizens,  the  perils  of  their  com- 
mercial intercourse,  the  jeopardy  of 
American  and  foreign  capital  invested 
in  Mexico,  make  it  unwise  and  impolitic 
for  the  Washington  Government  to  con- 
tinue a  policy  of  inaction  and  indiffer- 
ence to  Mexico.  It  would  seem  almost 
unbelievable  that  for  years  past  no  re- 
turn transportation  can  be  purchased 
between  the  commercial  capitals  of 
America  and  Mexico.  There  is  at  a  time 
of  peace  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  no  certainty  that  an  American 
landed  at  Vera  Cruz  or  Laredo  will  be 
allowed  to  reach  Mexico  City  or  to  return 
from  there.  What  other  Government 
besides  the  American  would  so  patiently 
endure  such  a  condition  of  things  for 
so  long  a  period? 


78     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

Now  that  ententes  between  America 
and  other  powers  are  in  order,  it  would 
seem  that  a  better  entente  between  Mex- 
ico and  the  United  States,  the  most  de- 
sirable of  all  ententes  for  America,  will 
not  be  much  longer  delayed.  The  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal  makes  it 
expedient  and  even  imperative  for  the 
safety  of  the  rapidly  increasing  popula- 
tion and  wealth  of  the  United  States  that 
the  future  joint  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  should  be  defi- 
nitive and  uniform.  The  protection  of 
the  Panama  Canal  against  foreign  ag- 
gression makes  it  equally  imperative 
that  America  should  come  to  a  speedy 
understanding  whereby  American  troops 
and  munitions  may  be  forwarded  by  land 
routes  to  Panama.  Only  in  this  way  can 
''American  liberty"  be  effectually  safe- 
guarded against  the  inevitable  foreign 
aggressions  which  time  in  the  ordinary 


MEXICO  79 

course  of  events  will  surely  develop. 
After  the  episode  of  Maximilian,  Ameri- 
cans have  no  further  justification  for 
believing  that  never  again  will  Mexico 
be  the  subject  of  foreign  attempts  at 
her  regeneration  or  even  her  domination. 
All  history  is  one  long  record  of  more 
repetitions  whenever  similar  conditions 
again  develop. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CANADA 

From  President  Washington's  first 
administration  until  a  comparatively  re- 
cent period  American  public  men  have 
not  been  unmindful  that  permanent  Eu- 
ropean domination  of  Canada  was  un- 
desirable for  the  United  States.  In  the 
last  century  startling  events  have 
brought  home  to  thoughtful  Americans 
the  apprehension  that  the  territory  to 
the  north  of  them  might  be  susceptible  of 
developments  which  would  prove  hostile 
to  their  security  and  safety.  The  ap- 
prehension was  made  particularly  great 
by  events  leading  to  the  Mexican  War, 
and  again  during  the  American  Civil 

80 


CANADA  81 

War  of  1861-65.  The  peace  of  America 
doubtless  may  be  endangered  by  events 
in  a  Canada  not  independent.  In  pos- 
sible foreign  complications  in  which 
America  may  be  involved,  unless  some 
closer  coalition  meanwhile  take  place, 
Canada  will  be  a  point  of  danger  for 
America.  Happily,  any  disturbance  due 
to  such  possible  conditions  seems  at  the 
moment  postponed.  Nevertheless,  there 
are  latent  forces  at  work  in  the  great 
Canadian  problems  which  forbid  Ameri- 
cans to  remain  indifferent  to  the  fate  of 
their  Northern  neighbor. 

Closely  allied  in  origin,  condition,  and 
disposition,  native  Americans  and  the 
native  British  Canadians  present  char- 
acteristics which  are  markedly  similar. 
A  common  language,  as  Bismarck  said, 
the  greatest  possible  bond  between  sepa- 
rated peoples  living  under  different 
governments,  a  common  jurisprudence, 


82     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

political  and  educational  institutions  not 
dissimilar  except  in  the  single  Province 
of  Quebec,  but  above  all  a  close  and  al- 
most interdependent  agriculture  and 
commerce,  all  tend  irresistibly  to  draw 
Canada  and  the  United  States  together. 
With  no  safe  winter  ports  of  her  own 
in  the  Atlantic  basin,  the  economic  inter- 
ests of  Canada  and  the  United  States 
are  in  all  essentials  the  same. 

But  Canada  has  been  far-distanced  in 
national  wealth  and  population  by  the 
United  States.  Canada  remains  rela- 
tively a  poor  state  at  the  present  time. 
The  notable  over-exploitation  of  her  re- 
sources has  caused  the  internal  and  the 
economic  problems  of  Canada  to  come  to 
be  such  as  to  compel  a  large  and  intelli- 
gent portion  of  her  population  to  recog- 
nize that  Canada  cannot  much  longer  re- 
main as  she  is.  Canada  must  draw 
closer  either  to  England  or  to  the  United 


CANADA  83 

States.  Tradition  would  reconcile  the 
British  part  of  her  population  to  the  pro- 
pose scheme  of  "imperialistic  federa- 
tion with  England  and  her  dependen- 
cies." But  their  personal  interests  dic- 
tate that  Canada  should  draw  closer  to 
the  United  States.  The  prolific  de- 
scendants of  old  French  Canada  would 
no  longer  offer  a  substantial  resistance 
to  some  union  with  the  United  States. 
They  perceive  that  their  coreligionists 
have  been  safe  under  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  and  that  their  church 
is  protected  there,  while  in  western  Can- 
ada it  meets  with  a  marked  hostility. 

The  serious  problem  of  the  future  of 
Canada  is  never  very  far  from  the 
thought  of  intelligent  Canadians  of  all 
antecedents  and  all  schools  of  political 
opinion.  No  American  who  has  made  a 
close  study  of  the  political  literature  and 
the  state  of  the  politics  of  Canada  can 


84     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

fail  to  recognize  that  some  speedy  politi- 
cal change  is  now  in  order  in  Canada. 
This  change  will  doubtless  be  much  facil- 
itated by  the  present  Great  War.  Mr. 
Bonar  Law  prophetically  said  in  Decem- 
ber, 1915,  '*  After  this  war  the  relations 
between  the  Dominions  and  the  Mother 
Country  can  never  be  the  same  again." 
This  is  generally  recognized  by  Cana- 
dians. 

There  have  been  times  in  the  last  cen- 
tury when  Canada  could  have  come 
closer  to  the  United  States  with  little  op- 
position from  England  or  from  Cana- 
dians, but  no  cordial  response  to  the 
proposal  was  made  in  America.  The 
close  and  changing  majorities  of  politi- 
cal parties  in  the  United  States  have  dis- 
inclined the  average  American  politician 
to  view  with  favor  any  near  political 
union  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada.    If  Canada  were  to  be  incor- 


CANADA  85 

porated  in  the  United  States,  and  the 
different  Canadian  Provinces  were  to 
become  States,  what  would  their  politics 
be?  This  question  has  not  been  lost 
sight  of  by  American  politicians.  If  the 
Canadian  States  should  all  incline  to  one 
great  political  party  in  the  United 
States,  the  balance  of  parties  would  be 
disturbed,  and  one  or  other  great  politi- 
cal party  might  lose  power  at  Washing- 
ton for  a  very  long  period.  This  has 
been  the  real  reason  of  the  indifference 
of  American  politicians  to  any  closer  po- 
litical union  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States.  Forty  years  ago  it  was 
the  recognition  of  this  attitude  of  Ameri- 
can politicians  that  disinclined  many 
public  men  in  Canada  to  favor  openly 
any  movement  looking  to  a  closer  politi- 
cal union  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States.  The  average  Canadian  politi- 
cian was  not  then  willing  to  risk  his  po- 


86     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

litical  future  in  view  of  the  cold  reserve 
of  the  American  fraternity.  Yet  this 
was  the  period  in  which  the  merger  of 
Canada  and  the  United  States  could 
have  been  most  easily  effected. 

But,  while  long  quiescent,  such  ques- 
tions will  not  down  in  Canada.  Even  at 
the  present  moment  they  are  being  dis- 
cussed, particularly  in  the  Province  of 
Quebec,  with  much  interest  and  ability. 
"Independence"  or  ''Imperial  Partner- 
ship," together  with  the  tertium  gaud- 
ens,  ''Union  with  the  United  States," 
are  favorite  topics  with  a  large  and  im- 
portant class  of  polemical  Canadian 
writers.  In  England  the  same  topics 
are  being  much  discussed  by  such  writers 
as  Mr.  Lionel  Curtis  ("The  Problem 
of  the  Commonwealth,"  The  Macmil- 
lan  Company).  Singularly  enough,  in 
America  these  same  subjects  are  re- 
ceiving scant  attention  in  any  quarter. 


CANADA  87 

The  reasons  for  the  more  marked  Cana- 
dian interest  in  these  questions  so  im- 
portant to  her  future  are  not  far  to  seek. 
The  internal  polities  of  Canada  are,  if 
anything,  now  in  a  less  elevated  and  sat- 
isfactory state  than  internal  politics  in 
the  United  States.  What  Sir  Charles 
Dilke  said  in  1890,  ' '  that  the  tone  of  pol- 
itics is,  on  the  whole,  higher  in  Canada 
than  in  the  United  States, "  is  no  longer 
true.  The  efficiency  of  the  governments 
of  the  large  cities  in  Canada  is  also  more 
unsatisfactory  than  it  is  in  the  large 
cities  of  the  United  States,  where  the 
municipal  resources  are  greater.  But 
above  all  other  reasons  for  a  certain 
manifest  inquietude  in  Canada  is  the  ap- 
prehension occasioned  by  the  exploita- 
tion of  the  natural  resources  of  the  coun- 
try with  the  public  funds.  After  the 
confederation  of  the  Canadian  Provinces 
and  their  quasi-independence,  all  the  ad- 


88     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

venturers  of  Lombard  Street  seem  to 
have  taken  up  their  abode  in  the  Domin- 
ion of  Canada.  The  expense  of  the  pres- 
ent war  to  Canada  bids  fair  to  bring  the 
results  of  this  excessive  exploitation  to 
a  speedy  and  accurate  reckoning.  The 
financial  condition  of  Canada  is,  in  fact, 
such  that  it  can  be  saved  only  by  the 
speedy  intervention  of  England  or  the 
United  States  after  this  war  shall  end. 
That  the  financial  rehabilitation  of  Can- 
ada should  be  undertaken  by  the  United 
States  alone  would  be  more  consistent 
with  the  policy  of  *' America  for  the 
Americans."  It  would  amply  repay 
either  America  or  England  to  assist  the 
development  of  Canada,  for  in  the  end 
it  is  destined  to  be  a  prosperous  coun- 
try. 

That  the  projected  imperial  federa- 
tion, by  which  all  the  countries  having 
close  political  relations  with  England 


CANADA  89 

shall  be  federated  into  one  great  impe- 
rial state,  with  England  at  the  head,  will 
be  in  the  interest  of  the  United  States 
ought  not  for  a  moment  to  be  admit- 
ted by  Americans.  Imperial  federation 
would,  if  anything,  be  even  less  desirable 
for  the  United  States  than  would  be  the 
independence  of  Canada  under  some  neu- 
tralization guaranteed  by  the  great  Eu- 
ropean powers.  It  ought  to  be  of  pro- 
found interest  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States  that  either  the  independence  of 
Canada  or  its  absorption  in  some  great 
scheme  of  British  imperial  federation  is 
destined  to  come  about  very  speedily  af- 
ter the  present  war.  That  it  is  so  des- 
tined is  now  generally  admitted  both  in 
Canada  and  in  England.  If  the  present 
war  produces  no  other  changes  in  the 
British  Empire,  it  is  at  least  certain  to 
produce  some  change  in  the  international 
status  of  Canada, 


90     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

If  Canada  should  become  actually  sov- 
ereign and  independent, — and  this  is  a 
consummation  not  only  in  the  interest  of 
the  Canadians  themselves,  but  the  best 
solution  for  the  United  States, — any 
guaranty  of  the  neutralization  of  the 
new  power  by  European  powers  would 
be  most  undesirable  for  the  United 
States.  With  an  absolutely  independ- 
ent Canada  commercial  treaties  and 
some  definitive  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance  could  be  made  by  the  United 
States.  It  would  be  highly  necessary 
for  the  United  States  that  the  arrange- 
ments be  made  speedily.  They  would 
not  at  first  be  rejected  by  an  independ- 
ent Canada,  for  her  foreign  relations 
would  be  on  the  same  plane  as  those  of 
the  United  States,  while  the  United 
States  would  furnish  to  Canada  her  nat- 
ural or  primary  markets. 

The  ''Imperial  Federation  League," 


CANADA  91 

the  program  of  which  imports  the  po- 
litical, military,  and  economic  reorgani- 
zation of  the  entire  British  Empire,  was 
founded  in  the  year  1884.  Ever  since, 
with  varying  fortunes  and  support,  the 
project  has  continued  to  grow.  "With 
the  close  of  the  present  war  the  nego- 
tiations for  federation  will  be  ripe  for 
consummation.  In  any  such  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  British  Empire,  Canada,  from 
its  geographical  position,  will  necessarily 
have  a  leading  place.  Canada  is  much 
nearer  to  both  Europe  and  Asia  than  is 
the  United  States.  As  early  as  1764  it 
was  suggested  by  Thomas  Pownall,  one 
of  the  very  few  able  administrators  up 
to  that  time  sent  by  England  to  the 
North  American  colonies,  that  the  seat 
of  Government  of  the  British  Empire 
should  be  transferred  to  America.  This 
premature  suggestion  long  afterward 
attracted  the  attention  of  Mr.  Gladstone, 


92     AMERICA  AFTER  TIJE  WAR 

who  considered  it  highly  interesting. 
Portugal  acted  on  Pownall's  suggestion 
and  transferred  its  dynasty  to  its  Bra- 
zilian Empire.  With  the  inevitable  al- 
terations in  the  diffusion  and  extent  of 
the  population  of  the  British  Empire, 
it  is  not  impossible  that  the  project  of 
Pownall  may  some  day  be  revived.  But 
whether  revived  or  dismissed,  imperial 
federation  will  necessarily  alter  essen- 
tially the  entire  military  program  of  the 
British  Empire.  Imperial  arsenals, 
dockyards,  and  fortifications  in  Canada 
would  become  inevitable.  That  they 
would  excite  the  lively  apprehensions  of 
Americans  there  can  be  no  justifica- 
tion for  doubting.  Imperial  federation 
would,  indeed,  be  little  less  menacing  to 
the  permanent  peace  of  America  than 
the  independence  and  neutralization  of 
Canada  under  some  guaranty  of  the 
great  European  powers.    Imperial  fed- 


CANADA  93 

eration  would  permanently  intrude  Eu- 
ropean questions  into  the  foreign  poli- 
cies of  America.  Canada  would  then 
necessarily  become  a  participant  in 
every  European,  Asiatic,  and  African 
problem  of  the  federated  empire. 

That  a  speedy  change  of  some  kind  in 
the  political  status  of  Canada  is  under 
way  is  apparent  not  only  from  the  pub- 
lic utterances  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law  and  the 
imperialists  in  Canada  and  England, 
but  from  the  Canadian  evolutions  of  the 
last  fifty  years.  The  official  construc- 
tion of  the  Canadian  militia  laws  in  1855, 
1862,  1868,  1883,  1899,  and  1904;  the 
English  colonial  conferences  of  1887, 
1902,  and  1907 ;  the  Canadian  naval  pro- 
gram of  1910  in  aid  of  Great  Britain — 
none  of  all  these  things  has  received  the 
attention  in  the  United  States  which  its 
importance  to  them  deserves.  Proud  of 
its  inherent  strength,  America  has  re- 


94     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

mained  strangely  indifferent  to  a  pro- 
gram which  some  day  is  destined  to  move 
it  profoundly. 

There  is  in  Canada  an  important  part 
of  the  population  who  favor  absolute  in- 
dependence of  Great  Britain.  These 
** nationalists,"  as  they  term  themselves, 
think  that  a  self-governing  state  ought 
not  to  be  dependent  or  subordinate  in 
any  respect.  It  should  be  free  to  control 
its  own  destiny.  The  nationalists  argue 
that  it  is  to  the  interest  of  Canada  to 
control  its  own  policies  and  foreign  re- 
lations, and  that  Canada  can  fulfil  its 
high  destiny  only  by  entering  the  family 
of  nations  as  a  completely  sovereign 
state.  If  the  absolute  independence  of 
Canada  should  ever  be  realized,  it  prob- 
ably would  be  the  best  solution  of  the 
Canadian  problem  for  the  United  States. 
The  territory  now  embraced  in  the 
United  States  is  already  so  extended  that 


CANADA  95 

its  proper  and  efficient  government  is 
not  free  from  difficulties.  To  enlarge 
the  number  of  States  of  the  Union  any- 
further  would  not  diminish  its  problems 
or  promote  the  more  efficient  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  while  it  might 
menace  the  permanency  of  the  Union. 
With  an  independent  republic  of  Can- 
ada relations  could  easily  be  established 
which  would  increase  the  safety  and  the 
prosperity  of  both  Canada  and  the 
United  States.  Canada,  from  its  extent 
and  the  character  of  its  population,  is 
naturally  a  democracy  and  likely  to 
remain  such.  The  United  States,  if  well 
governed,  is  likely  to  continue  indefi- 
nitely a  republic.  Monarchical  institu- 
tions do  not  and  cannot  flourish  in  such 
countries  as  Canada  and  the  United 
States  unless  artificially  fostered. 

On  the  other  hand,  some  kind  of  union 
of  Canada  and  the  United  States  would 


96     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

mucli  simplify  the  collection  of  revenue 
under  the  protective  system,  as  well  as 
the  plans  for  the  defensive  warfare  of 
both  countries.  Closely  allied,  the  two 
countries  would  be  in  an  insular  posi- 
tion, separated  from  the  rest  of  the 
world  by  vast  seas.  With  a  great  navy 
and  a  moderate  standing  army,  the  two 
countries  combined  could  resist  the  ag- 
gression of  the  entire  world.  Probably 
the  desirable  results  indicated  could  be 
attained  without  political  union  if  Can- 
ada were  an  independent  state  and  in  a 
position  to  enter  a  league  of  the  repub- 
lics of  North  America.  The  British 
scheme  of  imperial  federation  would 
frustrate  any  such  desirable  league. 

That  between  Canadians  and  Ameri- 
cans there  is  at  present  the  most  friendly 
feeling  is  a  fact  the  value  of  which  can- 
not be  overestimated.  That  a  period  of 
general  good  feeling  should  be  availed 


CANADA  97 

of  to  place  both  nations  in  a  position 
reciprocally  advantageous  is  evident. 
The  common  problems  for  the  two  coun- 
tries are  of  more  importance  to  them 
than  any  other,  and  their  proper  solu- 
tion will  call  for  a  high  order  of  states- 
manship in  both  Canada  and  the  United 
States.  With  Europe  both  Canada  and 
the  United  States  have  minor  interests, 
but  with  each  other  their  interests  are 
reciprocal  and  of  paramount  impor- 
tance. 

After  the  present  World  War  is  at  an 
end  the  problem  of  adequate  labor  for 
Canada  is  likely  to  become  acute.  There 
is  at  all  times  insufficient  labor  in  Can- 
ada. Ever  since  the  day  of  Sir  Alexan- 
der Gait,  an  able  Canadian,  schemes 
for  the  increase  of  labor  have  formed  a 
part  of  Canadian  policy.  One  of  the 
most  powerful  Canadian  arguments 
against  conscription  at  the  present  time 


98     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

is  that  it  will  stifle  European  emigration 
to  Canada.  Deprived  of  immigration 
for  a  long  period,  suggestions  of  Indian 
and  coolie  labor  will  fall  no  longer  on 
unwilling  ears  in  Canada.  Under  im- 
perial federation  the  hitherto  insoluble 
problem  for  the  British  Government  con- 
cerning the  disposition  of  the  surplus 
labor  of  India  would  tend  to  make  its  in- 
troduction into  Canada  reasonable  cer- 
tain. That  such  a  policy  would  be  ac- 
tively resented  in  the  United  States  is 
not  doubtful.  The  Asiatic  problem  is  in 
the  United  States  fundamentally  and 
primarily  a  labor  problem.  If  Asiatic 
laborers  should  swarm  in  either  Canada 
or  Mexico,  they  could  not  long  be  kept 
out  of  the  United  States.  This  is  only 
one  additional  reason  why  the  problems 
of  Canada  should  continue  to  interest 
the  people  of  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   WEST   INDIES 

The  group  of  islands  between  Florida 
and  South  America  are  collectively  des- 
ignated, in  common  parlance,  the  West 
Indies.  These  islands  are  all  directly 
within  the  proper  sphere  of  American 
influence  and  not  within  the  proper 
sphere  of  influence  of  Europe.  In  all 
these  islands  America  has  a  most  direct 
interest  that  they  shall  not  be  utilized  as 
the  future  bases  of  hostilities  directed 
against  either  North  or  South  America. 
As  the  islands  lie  directly  in  the  trade 
routes  of  the  American  hemisphere, 
it  cannot  be  claimed  with  justice  that 
either  Europe  or  Asia  has  an  equal  com- 

99 


100     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

mercial  interest  in  them.  American  in- 
terests of  all  kinds  in  the  West  Indies  are 
plainly  paramount  to  the  interests  of  all 
other  powers.  Consequently  most  of  the 
larger  islands  in  the  West  Indies  have 
already  passed  under  the  control  of 
America,  and  the  rest  in  course  of  due 
time  bid  fair  to  follow. 

Any  examination  of  the  personal  in- 
terests of  the  West  Indian  Islands  will 
disclose  that  economic  influences  prompt 
them  to  seek  incorporation  with  Amer- 
ica. In  those  of  the  islands  which  have 
already  come  under  American  domina- 
tion the  agricultural  and  other  island 
resources  quickly  revived,  whereas  un- 
der European  domination  they  lan- 
guished or  disappeared.  In  the  process 
of  extinguishing  the  proprietorship  of 
Europe  in  the  West  Indies  all  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  are  aiding  America. 
The  islands  of  the  Atlantic  stand  in  a 


THE  WEST  INDIES  101 

peculiarly  close  relation  to  America. 
America  lias  no  colonial  possessions  on 
the  mainland  of  Europe,  Africa,  and 
Asia,  and  it  would  be  highly  impolitic 
for  her  to  accept  any  colonial  juris- 
diction in  any  part  of  Europe,  Africa, 
or  on  the  mainland  of  Asia.  If  terri- 
tories in  those  quarters  of  the  world  were 
presented  to  her,  it  would  be  the  act 
of  the  enemies  rather  than  the  act  of  the 
friends  of  America.  In  all  the  Ameri- 
cas and  their  adjacent  seas  lie  all  the  best 
interests  of  America.  The  West  Indies 
are  directly  within  the  American  sphere 
of  interest. 

The  islands  of  the  Pacific  other  than 
those  belonging  to  the  great  powers,  in- 
cluding Japan,  do  not  occupy  the  same 
relation  to  America  as  the  Asiatic  main- 
land. America  has  already  acquired 
large  and  important  island  possessions 
in  the  Pacific,  and  her  tenure  of  these  is 


102     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

morally  superior  to  that  of  any  of  the 
other  great  powers  exclusive  of  China 
and  Japan.  As  one  of  the  leading  coun- 
tries bordering  on  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
America  has  the  most  direct  concern  in 
the  islands  of  the  Pacific.  The  economic 
interests  of  the  rapidly  developing  por- 
tion of  the  United  States  lying  west  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains  in  the  trade  of  the 
Pacific  are  already  so  extensive  that  the 
general  Government  cannot  ignore  them. 
The  Pacific  States  of  America  would  not 
long  tolerate  governmental  indifference 
to  their  paramount  interests.  The  trade 
and  commerce  of  the  Pacific  are  most 
important  for  the  long  future  of  the 
Western  United  States.  The  proxim- 
ity of  the  cities  of  San  Diego,  Los  An- 
geles, San  Francisco,  Portland,  Tacoma, 
and  Seattle  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  tends  to 
develop  certain  characteristics  peculiar 
to  all  the  Pacific.    The  trade  intercourse 


THE  WEST  INDIES         103 

between  the  Atlantic  States  of  America 
and  the  West  Indies  creates  a  very  close 
bond. 

The  facilities  of  intercourse  between 
countries  bordering  on  the  same  seas 
always  create  common  interests  in  all 
the  peoples  of  the  seaboard  districts. 
Their  daily  intercourse  tends  to  produce 
a  certain  uniformity  of  temperament, 
manners,  and  culture  in  the  populations 
of  coast  to^Tis  lying  on  the  same  seas 
without  much  regard  to  their  respective 
nationalities.  All  the  peoples  living  on 
the  Mediterranean  show  marked  similar- 
ities, and  to  acute  observers  they  are  dis- 
tinguishable from  their  countrymen  liv- 
ing remote  from  the  Mediterranean. 
So  the  peoples  living  on  the  sea  coast  of 
the  North  Atlantic  basin  are  much  in- 
fluenced by  certain  common  forces  not 
felt  by  their  countrymen  of  the  interior. 
The  inhabitants  of  New  York  and  Boston 


104     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

are,  for  instance,  in  closer  touch  with  the 
thought  and  interests  of  London  and 
Bordeaux  than  are  the  inhabitants  of 
the  cities  in  the  middle  States  of  Amer- 
ica. It  is  obvious  that  the  thought  of 
London,  New  York,  and  Boston  is 
greatly  affected  by  common  interests  and 
by  the  facility  of  their  intercourse  by 
sea.  Daily  and  hourly  the  ships  come 
and  go  between  them  with  peculiar  mes- 
sages for  themselves  only.  In  the  great 
towns  of  middle  America  the  thought  of 
London  or  Bordeaux  has  little  or  no  di- 
rect influence. 

The  immense  mass  and  weight  of 
America  are  already  exercising  an  irre- 
sistible force  in  attracting  the  West  In- 
dies to  it.  As  President  John  Adams 
said,  **  There  are  laws  of  political  as  well 
as  of  physical  gravitation."  This  force 
is  now  almost  irresistible  in  the  West  In- 
dies.   It  has  been  sought  in  vain  to  coun- 


THE  WEST  INDIES         105 

teract  it  by  subsidies  to  the  islands  from 
European  governments  or  by  the  spe- 
cial privileges  called  reciprocities.  Not- 
withstanding these  encouragements,  the 
trade  of  the  West  Indies  continues  to 
seek  its  natural  American  channels. 
This  invariable  tendency  of  trade  is  ob- 
servable even  in  the  distant  North  At- 
lantic island  of  Bermuda,  where  the  flag 
alone  continues  British,  and  this  only  be- 
cause the  flagstaff  is  of  good  English 
oak. 

Except  as  coaling  ports  and  dockyards 
the  West  Indies  are  now  of  very  little 
importance  to  the  European  powers. 
From  the  economic  point  of  view  the 
West  Indian  Islands  still  retained  by 
Europe  are  positively  disadvantageous 
to  Europeans,  and  their  longer  reten- 
tion is  prompted  only  by  motives  of  am- 
bition or  sentiment.  That  the  European 
powers  could  continue  to  hold  their  West 


106     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAE 

Indian  possessions  during  a  war  with 
America  is  unlikely.  It  would  be  an 
indication  of  friendliness  on  the  part  of 
Europe  to  follow  the  example  of  Den- 
mark and  cede  all  the  West  Indies  to 
America.  Their  usefulness  to  Europe 
as  coaling  stations  will  cease  with  scien- 
tific changes  in  the  nature  of  the  meth- 
ods of  propulsion,  and  as  dockyards  their 
importance  will  decrease  with  the  in- 
creasing radius  of  commercial  vessels. 
Any  necessary  European  user  of  the 
islands  could  be  better  provided  for  by 
stipulation  in  the  acts  of  cession  to  the 
United  States. 

Owing  to  its  fertility,  its  temperate 
climate,  and  the  abundance  of  its  food 
supply,  the  population  of  America  is 
bound  to  increase  with  leaps  and  bounds 
after  the  war.  The  United  States  is 
more  than  half  as  large  as  China  and 
Europe  combined,  and  yet  its  continental 


THE  WEST  INDIES  107 

population  is  only  about  a  hundred  mil- 
lions at  present.  It  will  in  time  readily 
support  and  maintain  more  than  seven 
hundred  millions.  That  it  is  destined  to 
be  densely  populated  and  highly  devel- 
oped is  certain.  When  America  is  in  the 
condition  of  Europe  as  regards  density 
of  population  and  internal  development, 
the  West  Indies  will  belong  exclusively 
to  America.  The  Caribbean  Sea  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  will  be  what  they  now 
are,  the  American  Mediterranean,  but 
with  this  difference :  they  will  be,  as  they 
should  be,  exclusively  under  American 
domination. 

In  the  general  peace  to  follow  the  pres- 
ent World  War  the  Entente  statesmen 
could  do  much  toward  the  better  defini- 
tion and  limitation  of  the  American 
spheres  of  influence  in  the  West  Indies. 
That  they  will  not  neglect  this  Ameri- 
cans feel  confident,  despite  unofficial  dis- 


108     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

claimers  that  no  advantage  whatever  for 
America  is  sought  by  the  war.  It  would 
be  detrimental  to  Americans  if  the  pub- 
lic authorities  should  neglect  the  real  in- 
terests of  America  at  a  time  when  the 
foreign  powers  are  in  the  mood  to  make 
concessions  of  things  of  no  value  to  them 
from  any  point  of  view.  If  the  Euro- 
pean powers  attached  any  real  value  to 
their  empty  titles  of  sovereignty  in  the 
"West  Indies,  the  case  would  be  differ- 
ent. The  continuation  of  Europe  in  the 
West  Indies  can  have  no  adequate  moral 
foundation,  while  it  is,  and  ought  to  be, 
displeasing  to  America. 

By  reason  of  the  mere  cooperation  of 
America  with  England  in  the  present 
Great  War  England's  precarious  tenure 
of  her  widely  extended  empire  has  al- 
ready been  assured  for  an  indefinite  pe- 
riod beyond  her  reasonable  hopes.  If 
England  does  not  recognize  this  fact,  her 


THE  WEST  INDIES         109 

statesmen  do,  and  it  is  her  statesmen 
who  control  the  immediate  future  of  the 
British  West  Indies.  That  the  peace 
negotiations  could  be  made  the  means  of 
transferring  Jamaica  and  Nassau,  for 
example,  from  England  to  America  is 
not  doubtful  if  English  statesmen  are 
willing  to  consent.  They  certainly  will 
not  consent  if  they  are  not  asked  by 
America  to  make  the  cession. 

When  America  is  as  densely  popu- 
lated as  its  resources  and  situation  prom- 
ise, the  now  potential  resources  of  the 
West  Indies  will  not  fail  to  be  utilized  on 
the  mainland.  With  la  petite  culture,  or 
intensive  cultivation  by  small  proprie- 
tors, the  production  of  food  in  the  West 
Indies  may  be  made  almost  unlimited. 
Charles  Kingsley,  in  his  charming 
sketch  of  the  West  Indies,  fifty  years 
ago,  pointed  out  that  the  same  space  of 
ground  in  the  West  Indies  is  capable  of 


no     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

producing  133  times  the  amount  of  food 
producible  in  the  wheat-growing  areas  of 
America.  The  food  supply  of  a  na- 
tion in  the  last  analysis  is  the  funda- 
mental purpose  of  government.  With- 
out an  abundance  of  food  the  progress 
of  a  nation  is  seriously  hampered.  Its 
limit  of  development  is  determined  only 
by  the  limitation  of  its  own  natural  food- 
giving  areas.  A  nation  dependent  on 
another  nation  for  food  is  at  all  times 
in  a  more  or  less  dangerous  position. 
That  the  United  States  will  not  in  the 
end  be  indifferent  to  the  food  areas  of 
the  West  Indies  is  certain. 

The  completion  of  the  Panama  Canal 
by  the  United  States  and  the  importance 
to  America  of  keeping  it  open  at  all  times 
for  the  coastwise  commerce  of  the  United 
States  give  a  new  strategic  importance 
to  the  possession  of  the  West  Indies  by 
the  United  States.    In  the  possession  of 


THE  WEST  INDIES         111 

a  European  power  the  West  Indian  Is- 
lands are  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Amer- 
ica. They  can  be  retained  by  Europe 
only  with  some  latent  design  hostile  to 
America.  In  a  war  exclusively  between 
European  or  Asiatic  powers  their  cus- 
tody has  only  some  remote  significance. 
The  retention  of  the  West  Indies  by  Eu- 
rope because  it  promotes  its  world  com- 
merce would  justify  its  possession  of  the 
shores  of  all  parts  of  the  world.  It  is 
an  argument  the  validity  of  which  can- 
not be  admitted  in  America.  World 
conomerce  in  the  end  must  be  regulated 
by  a  superior  and  binding  law  of  na- 
tions and  not  by  hostile  and  armed  cita- 
dels seated  in  foreign  countries  or  at 
points  immediately  adjacent  to  them. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ASIA  AND    THE   PACIFIC 

That  the  present  Great  War  and  its 
solutions  will  have  a  lasting  effect  on  the 
future  of  Asia  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  as 
an  international  highway  is  clearly  dis- 
cerned by  the  leading  eastern  Asiatic 
powers.  Both  have  therefore  prepared 
for  representation  in  the  final  peace 
council.  The  late  action  of  China  is 
peculiarly  significant.  It  nominally  en- 
tered the  war  in  order  to  safeguard  its 
national  future.  China  was  unwilling 
that  its  interests  in  the  peace  conference 
should  be  abandoned  to  the  great  Eu- 
ropean powers.  China  is  a  belligerent 
because  it  does  not  intend  that  the  final 

112 


ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC     113 

decisions  of  the  peace  conference  in  re- 
gard to  the  future  of  the  Orient  shall 
go  by  default.  In  this  action  Chinese 
statesmen  have  acted  astutely.  The 
time  has  doubtless  come  for  China  to  cry 
halt  to  European  aggressions.  These 
aggressions  have  gone  further  than  is 
consistent  with  the  interests  of  America. 
America  has  a  supreme  interest  in  East- 
ern Asia,  the  ''open  door."  The  suc- 
cess of  the  ''open-door"  policy  demands 
that  eastern  Asia,  in  common  with  the 
rest  of  the  world,  shall  be  left  to  govern 
itself  consistently  with  the  general  law 
of  nations.  The  abstract  right  of  the 
Chinese  to  govern  themselves  can  no 
longer  be  ignored.  As  an  American  doc- 
trine it  is  rapidly  coming  to  the  fore. 
The  right  of  the  Chinese  to  govern  them- 
selves is  as  well  founded  as  the  right  of 
Americans  to  govern  themselves,  and  by 
Americans    it    cannot   be    safely   chal- 


114     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

lenged.  The  American  Government  at 
Washington  has  been  theoretically  con- 
sistent in  upholding  the  plea  of  "Asia 
for  the  Asiatics";  but  it  has  lacked  the 
power  and  will  to  enforce  either  the  in- 
tegrity of  China  or  the  ''open-door" 
policy. 

The  "open-door"  policy  was  first  pro- 
nounced by  the  American  secretary  of 
state,  John  Hay,  in  1899.  The  "open 
door'  graphically  prefigures  little  more 
than  equal  commercial  opportunities  for 
all  foreigners,  including  Americans,  in 
China  and  its  dependencies  or  provinces. 
The  doctrine  of  the  "open  door"  is  un- 
fortunately much  complicated  by  rail- 
way and  other  concessions  granted  by 
China  to  Europe.  These  cessions  have 
diminished  the  sovereignty  of  China 
throughout  extensive  provinces  of  its 
empire.  But  the  most  formidable  ob- 
stacles to  the  "open  door"  are  the  ex- 


ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC     115 

elusive  territorial  ambitions  of  both  Kus- 
sia  and  Japan,  not  opposed  by  England 
or  France.  The  Russians  and  the  Japa- 
nese have  virtually  closed  the  ''open 
door"  in  Mongolia  and  Manchuria. 
Their  action  is  regarded  in  the  Orient 
as  fatal  to  the  American  plan  of  the 
''open  door."  Wherever  Japan  or 
Russia  has  encroached  on  Chinese  ter- 
ritory the  door  is  no  longer  left  wide 
open. 

The  particular  pretensions  in  China 
of  Japan  and  Russia  have  hitherto  been 
consistently  supported  by  England  and 
France  of  the  present  Entente  powers 
without  great  regard  for  the  American 
"open-door"  policy.  The  history  of 
Manchuria  and  the  Chinchow-Aigun 
railway  project  would  alone  demonstrate 
the  accuracy  of  this  statement.  It 
therefore  becomes  a  serious  problem  for 
America,  where,  if  anywhere,  she  is  to 


116     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

look  for  an  ally  if  she  ever  concludes  to 
enforce  her  ** open-door"  policy  in  the 
Orient.  If  America  concludes  that  she 
must  enforce  the  ''open  door"  by  her- 
self, and  the  time  is  fast  approaching 
when  the  great  States  lying  west  of  the 
Rocky  Mountains  will  insist  on  some  sort 
of  Federal  action  about  the  "open 
door,"  it  is  evident  that  the  military 
strength  of  America  after  the  present 
war  must  be  maintained  even  when  it 
shall  be  placed  on  a  peace  footing. 
Otherwise  America  will  be  in  a  very  ex- 
posed situation.  Japan  has  promised 
to  return  to  China  after  the  war  the 
territory  of  Kiao-chau,  leased  to  Ger- 
many by  China  and  now  held  by  Japan. 
If  the  German  protectorate  is  not  so  re- 
turned after  the  war,  what  is  to  be  the 
sequence  and  significance  of  the  refusal? 
Kiao-chau  is  a  minor  matter.  Amer- 
ica is  one  of  the  great  powers  having  di- 


ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC    117 

rect  interests  in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  With 
the  exception  of  China  and  Japan,  no 
other  power  has  such  extensive  interests 
in  the  highways  of  the  Pacific  as  Amer- 
ica. The  Pacific  furnishes  the  western 
boundary  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
greater  trade  of  the  vast  region  of 
America  lying  west  of  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains will  sooner  or  later  be  over  the 
Pacific  with  the  Orient.  The  territorial 
interests  of  England  and  France  in 
China  are  not  comparable  with  those  of 
America.  The  real  interests  of  England 
and  France  are  in  southern  Asia  and  in 
the  southern  Pacific.  How  America  is 
to  safeguard  effectually  its  particular 
interests  in  China  and  the  Pacific  is  des- 
tined to  be  one  of  the  greatest  problems 
for  American  statesmen. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  proper  foreign 
policy  of  America  turns  upon  two  great 
principles,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 


118     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

'  *  open  door. ' '  The  practical  application 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  confined  to  the 
Western  Hemisphere;  the  "open  door" 
to  the  Eastern.  Unless  America  is  pre- 
pared to  enforce  both,  it  would  have  been 
more  conducive  to  the  peace  of  America 
had  they  never  been  formulated.  The 
safety  and  the  prosperity  of  America 
are,  however,  so  intimately  concerned 
with  both  policies  that  they  cannot  be 
abandoned.  Therefore  America  must 
be  prepared  to  enforce  them  whenever 
they  are  flagrantly  assailed,  or  America 
will  lose  its  rightful  place  as  a  great 
power. 

America  has  become  a  great  nation  by 
reason  of  its  natural  resources,  its  con- 
stantly augmenting  population,  and  its 
ever-growing  commerce.  The  natural 
resources  will  cease  to  be  developed,  the 
population   and   the   commerce   of   the 


ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC     119 

country  will  cease  to  grow,  if  neglected 
by  the  Government  at  Washington ;  they 
require  an  intelligent  and  an  energetic 
national  policy  for  their  proper  conser- 
vation. American  merchants  are  free  to 
seek  the  protection  of  any  more  power- 
ful government,  and  if  America  neglects 
its  own  merchants,  they  will  seek  a  more 
splendid  flag.  American  commerce  will 
inevitably  follow  her  merchants.  It  is 
essential,  therefore,  that  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States  shall  be  made 
to  measure  up  to  its  responsibilities  if 
the  country  is  to  continue  permanently 
successful  and  powerful.  Unless  a  na- 
tion cooperates  closely  with  its  mer- 
chants and  fosters  their  foreign  com- 
merce by  every  legitimate  means  in  its 
power,  national  prosperity  will  surely 
cease,  and  political  decadence  follow. 
There  can  be  no  successful  domestic  com- 


120     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

merce  in  a  country  where  the  foreign 
commerce  is  not  intelligently  promoted 
by  the  Government. 

The  acquisition  of  the  islands  of  the 
Pacific  now  under  American  dominion 
was  pursuant  to  the  best  national  policy. 
Hawaii,  Samoa,  Guam,  and  the  Philip- 
pines are  not  only  important  points  of 
call,  but  important  protected  refuges 
for  American  shipping  in  the  Pacific. 
The  retention  by  America  of  these 
islands  does  not  violate  the  principle  of 
**Asia  for  the  Asiatics."  None  of  them 
was  acquired  from  an  Asiatic  power. 
America  is  a  co-owner  of  the  shores  of 
the  Pacific,  and  one  of  the  largest.  In 
the  distant  future  its  commerce  on  the 
Pacific  will  far  surpass  in  importance 
to  America  that  of  the  Atlantic  side. 
The  future  of  American  commerce  for- 
bids America  to  neglect  or  to  abandon  its 
rightfully  acquired  island  possessions  in 


ASIA  AND  THE  PACIFIC    121 

the  Pacific.  No  European  power,  indeed 
no  Asiatic  power,  questions  the  right  of 
America  to  the  Pacific  islands  which 
have  passed  under  its  flag.  It  holds 
them  by  a  completely  valid  title,  and  it 
must  not  part  with  them,  or  it  will  be 
false  to  its  trust  and  to  the  future  good 
of  the  American  nation. 

America,  unlike  England,  has  never 
sought  territorial  possessions  remote 
from  its  proper  shores.  Every  acquisi- 
tion of  outlying  lands  has  had  direct  ref- 
erence to  the  proper  sphere  of  Ameri- 
can influence  and  to  the  immediate  in- 
terests of  its  domestic  territories.  Had 
the  Philippines  been  owned  by  China  or 
Japan,  America  would  not  have  acquired 
them.  They  were  ceded  to  America  by 
a  European  power  in  deference  to  the 
superior  interests  of  America  in  the 
trade  of  the  Pacific.  America,  unlike 
the  European  powers,  has  never  sought 


122     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

any  territory  or  ''sphere  of  influence" 
on  the  Asiatic  mainland.  The  Ameri- 
can title  to  the  Philippines  is  not  deroga- 
tory to  any  Asiatic  power.  The  islands 
are  rightfully  American  and  they  are  a 
tremendous  and  natural  auxiliary  to  the 
long  future  of  the  rich  trade  between 
Asia  and  America.  If  the  Philippines 
are  abandoned  by  America,  the  descent 
of  America  into  the  ranks  of  the  de- 
cadent and  nerveless  powers  will  be 
rapid  and  certain.  Asia  is  not  im- 
pressed by  a  foreign  power  which  ex- 
hibits neither  strength  nor  consistency, 
for  Asiatics  are  quick  to  realize  that 
without  these  qualities  no  nation  can  be 
either  successful  or  permanent. 


CHAPTER  IX 

AMERICA  AFTER   THE  WAR 

After  the  present  war  the  conditions 
of  the  world  will  be  greatly  changed,  and 
America  can  never  again  be  quite  the 
same.  The  isolation  of  America  will 
have  ended ;  its  relations  to  foreign  pow- 
ers will  be  reversed.  But  the  value  of 
its  alliance  with  France,  England,  Italy, 
and  Japan  and  ** preparedness"  will  for 
a  long  period  be  worth  to  America  all 
they  have  cost,  and  the  cost  has  been  al- 
ready prodigious.  The  internal  prob- 
lems of  America  after  the  war  will  not 
be  diminished.  Only  a  few  of  the  prob- 
lems, foreign  and  domestic,  have  been 
noticed  in  the  preceding  pages.    There 

123 


124     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

are  many  others.  By  means  of  the  war 
it  will  have  become  evident  to  Americans 
that  a  very  prosperous  nation,  with  an 
extended  and  exposed  territory,  cannot 
safely  be  left  longer  undefended,  and 
that  the  future  measures  for  the  defense 
of  the  country  must  be  more  commensu- 
rate with  its  dangers  and  the  national 
potentiality.  Americans  will  not  here- 
after rely  on  the  isolated  position  of 
America,  nor  will  they  easily  resume 
their  former  policy  of  trusting  the  de- 
fense of  the  country  wholly  to  chance. 
If  they  do,  they  will  in  the  end  suffer  un- 
told miseries,  and  the  prosperity  of 
America  will  vanish  as  quickly  as  it  ap- 
peared. 

Not  only  must  the  American  be  made 
a  more  efficient  government  from  every 
point  of  view,  but  it  must  be  kept  effi- 
cient. America  can  never  again,  after 
this  war,  safely  return  to  its  indiffer- 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR     125 

ence  to  the  military  situation  of  the 
country.  It  has  chosen  to  assert  itself 
as  a  great  power  in  the  world,  and  it 
must  recognize  the  responsibilities  and 
the  risks  which  the  assertion  involved,  or 
it  will  fall  as  other  weak  countries  have 
always  fallen.  There  is  now  no  inter- 
mediate choice  for  Americans.  They 
must  be  up  and  onward  or  fall  to  pieces. 
In  the  future  America  must  be  made 
able  to  stand  by  itself ;  it  can  safely  trust 
to  the  permanency  of  no  alliance ;  it  must 
be  prepared  at  all  cost  to  resist  aggres- 
sion from  any  and  every  quarter.  To  do 
this  it  must  be  kept  a  strong  as  well  as 
a  rich  nation.  The  enmities  and  the 
jealousies  created  by  the  present  war 
will  not  subside  for  a  century.  If  they 
should,  a  rich  nation,  helpless  and  unpre- 
pared to  defend  itself,  is  certain,  when  a 
good  opportunity  offers,  to  be  attacked. 
A  nation  with  the  sharp  enmities  ere- 


126     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

ated  by  American  policies  is  in  a  par- 
ticularly dangerous  situation.  Only  by 
remaining  prepared  can  America  hope 
to  escape  unscathed. 

The  methods  thus  far  characteristic 
of  American  democracy  are  not  condu- 
cive to  the  permanent  peace  of  America. 
The  constant  rotation  in  office,  which  is  a 
principle  of  democracy,  often  brings  into 
power  men  not  trained  in  either  state- 
craft or  diplomacy.  Many  of  the  suc- 
cessful lawyers  and  the  prominent  poli- 
ticians promoted  to  high  office  at  Wash- 
ington are  not  profoundly  trained  in  the 
art  of  government.  Some  of  them  have 
little  familiarity  with  even  the  foreign 
relations  of  America,  while  only  a  few  of 
them  are  deeply  versed  in  the  finer  art 
of  diplomacy.  Such  things  are  not 
easily  acquired  by  men  not  in  public  life ; 
they  require  a  lifelong  training. 

The  rest  of  the  world  asserts  that  the 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR    127 

foreign  policy  of  America  has  been  char- 
acterized by  a  certain  abrupt  directness 
which  is  inconsistent  with  the  usages  of 
diplomacy  and  is  unnecessarily  disturb- 
ing to  the  peace  of  the  world.  The  di- 
rectness of  American  diplomacy  is  too 
often  mistaken  by  foreign  states  for 
either  menace  or  a  sign  of  unfriendli- 
ness. When  it  is  mistaken  for  menace, 
America  is  left  in  a  very  unsafe  position 
unless  prepared  for  sudden  attack.  It 
does  not  diminish  the  danger  to  plead 
that  the  ''directness"  of  America  in  dip- 
lomatic negotiations  is  not  intended  to 
be  minatory  or  unfriendly,  or  that 
American  diplomacy  is  only  one  phase  of 
a  government  in  which  the  people  rule. 
The  necessity  that  American  diplomats 
shall  not  disregard  ''popular  opinion" 
doubtless  too  often  obligates  them  to  a 
sort  of  spectacular  diplomacy  which  is 
certainly  not  consistent  with  diplomatic? 


128     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

usage  as  hitherto  understood.  The  ex- 
igencies of  politics  in  America  often  re- 
quire an  administration  to  submit  its 
foreign  policies  at  every  stage  to  the 
people,  although  the  electors  themselves 
have  no  settled  foreign  policy  upon 
which  the  administration  and  its  diplo- 
matic corps  can  rely.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  disadvantage  of  democracy  as 
a  principle  of  government  is  observable 
in  the  history  of  American  foreign  rela- 
tions. There  is  in  America  no  such 
thing  as  a  settled  foreign  policy  binding 
on  successive  administrations.  This  is 
not  so  in  France  or  England.  The  de- 
fect can  be  corrected  only  by  greater  loy- 
alty of  Americans  to  constituted  au- 
thority and  by  a  deeper  popular  convic- 
tion, gleaned  from  hard  experience,  that 
matters  of  foreign  policy  should  proceed 
on  a  settled  and  permanent  principle 
which  must  be  determined  by  competent 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR     129 

governmental  agents  trained  in  the  art 
of  diplomacy. 

The  accusation  of  the  world  that 
American  diplomacy  too  frequently  ex- 
hibits an  unfriendly  attitude  which  is  not 
sufficiently  conciliatory  is  in  part  due  to 
the  unusual  frankness  characteristic  of 
American  diplomacy.  To  be  effectual, 
diplomacy  must  be  reticent.  Much  of 
the  information  imputed  to  diplomats 
should,  if  repeated,  be  confined  to  the 
archives  of  the  State  Department.  The 
English  foreign  minister,  Mr.  Balfour, 
in  August,  1917,  lucidly  and  satisfac- 
torily explained  to  Parliament  the  real 
reasons  for  diplomatic  reticence.  His 
explanation  must  have  been  very  dis- 
quieting to  some  diplomats  in  America. 
Not  only  should  diplomacy  be  reticent, 
but  it  should  be  stately.  European  di- 
plomacy has  been  built  up  on  a  policy 
of  compromise,  facilitated  by  a  distin- 


130     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

guished  conciliation  and  marked  official 
politeness.  The  diction  of  diplomatic 
intercourse  should  at  all  times  be  one  of 
extreme  civility.  The  use  of  the  term 
"demand"  in  international  negotiations 
is,  for  example,  equivalent  in  European 
diplomacy  to  hostilities.  In  American 
diplomacy  the  term  ** demand"  has  not 
had  the  same  significance.  It  has  been 
used  on  several  occasions  with  very  awk- 
ward results.  Doubtless  America  has 
occasionally  had  diplomats  of  excep- 
tional ability,  but  it  has  had  more  of  in- 
adequate attainment.  If  America  is  to 
continue  to  pursue  its  past  diplomatic 
methods,  it  should  have  a  greater  force 
always  behind  it.  The  Japanese  states- 
man Count  Okuma  is  reported  to  have 
said  in  1915,  ''Diplomacy,  to  be  really 
effective  and  successful,  must  be  backed 
up  by  sufficient  national  strength." 
The   directness   and   the   exigencies   of 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR     131 

American  diplomacy  make  it  particu- 
larly necessary  that  America  should  be 
prepared  for  hostile  eventualities. 

The  proper  conservation  of  all  the  ele- 
ments of  a  nation's  strength  is  a  prime 
duty  of  a  great  government.  When  a 
nation's  territory  is  so  situated  that  it 
has  an  extensive  coast  bordering  on  the 
open  seas  and  a  large  population  dwell- 
ing on  the  seaboard,  and  yet  the  nation 
has  no  commercial  marine  and  no  seafar- 
ing men,  there  is  evidently  something 
awry  in  the  governmental  policies  or 
some  omission  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 
ment. After  the  present  war  America 
will  in  all  probability  be  reinstated  in 
the  leading  position  which  it  once  held 
on  the  high  seas.  It  is  now  becoming 
apparent  in  America  that  it  is  not  good 
policy  to  abandon  transportation  of 
American  commerce  to  foreigners. 
Americans  at  last  begin  to  see,  also,  that 


132     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

a  commercial  marine  is  an  important 
auxiliary  in  waging  successful  warfare, 
defensive  or  offensive.  Had  America  in 
1914  possessed  a  great  mercantile  ma- 
rine and  an  adequate  armed  force,  the 
entire  course  of  the  general  war  in  Eu- 
rope would  have  been  different.  That 
America  should  in  the  future  maintain  a 
mercantile  marine  has  already  become  a 
common  conviction  in  the  American 
coast  towns.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this 
conviction  will  become  general. 

The  building  up  of  a  commercial  ma- 
rine will  be  one  of  the  after-war  prob- 
lems; but  the  greatest  of  all  such  prob- 
lems will  be  '* preparedness."  In  a  de- 
mocracy preparedness  meets  with  an 
opposition  not  tolerated  in  states  exist- 
ing under  more  centralized  forms  of  gov- 
ernment. Before  discussing  the  prob- 
lems of  the  American  commercial  marine 
and  ** preparedness,"  it  will  be  best  to 


AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR     133 

consider  the  characteristics  of  American 
democracy,  for  they  affect  both  prepar- 
edness and  the  commercial  marine  of 
America. 


CHAPTER  X 

DEMOCKACY 

In  the  course  of  the  polemics  of  the 
pending  war,  Democracy  has  been  much 
emphasized  by  the  politicians.  Democ- 
racy, as  a  principle  of  government,  has 
the  defects  of  its  virtues.  In  ancient 
times  it  was  thought  to  be  fatal  to  free- 
dom. In  modern  times  it  is  generally 
believed  to  promote  freedom  and  liberty, 
but  to  fail  in  efficiency.  That  it  is  nec- 
essarily inefficient  old-fashioned  native 
Americans  deny.  It  is  by  no  means  cer- 
tain that  a  democratic  republic  cannot  be 
made  equal  to  all  the  exigencies  of  na- 
tional life.  It  is,  however,  the  fact  that 
to  Americans  of  the  old  school  democ- 

134 


DEMOCRACY  135 

racy  means  something  quite  different 
from  the  rampant  kinds  of  democracy 
which  many  politicians  of  the  present 
day  applaud. 

At  the  foundation  of  the  general  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  ''democ- 
racy" stood  for  a  popular  government 
of  an  ordered  and  highly  conservative 
kind.  To  Americans  of  the  old  school, 
democracy,  in  a  glorified  sense,  conse- 
quently became  almost  the  equivalent  of 
civil  liberty.  Such  Americans  are  confi- 
dent that  popular  judgment  in  the  end 
will  sustain  civil  liberty  and  order  and 
refrain  from  excesses.  This  is  the  prob- 
lem. Will  it?  Unfortunately,  there  is 
a  new  theory  of  democracy  coming  up  in 
America,  a  theory  which  some  modern 
politicians  would  carry  to  extremes.  If 
this  new  school  were  to  triumph,  we 
should  have  a  weak  and  spasmodic  form 
of  democracy,  with  a  government  badly 


136     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

adapted  to  times  of  stress  and  confusion. 
Thus  far  in  its  history  the  United  States 
has  proved  to  the  world  that  a  demo- 
cratic republic  may  be  highly  efficient 
and  powerful  even  in  times  of  war.  The 
new  school  of  democracy  deprecates  any 
efficiency  for  war,  and  in  this  respect 
their  departure  from  a  historic  creed 
separates  them  from  the  American  dem- 
ocrats of  the  old  school.  President  Wil- 
son has  recently  showed  that  he  has  no 
lasting  sympathy  with  the  new  school 
and  that  he  favors  a  militant  democracy 
of  the  historic  type.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  his  present  conviction  will  not  again 
change  after  peace  ensues. 

Let  us  inquire  what  modern  Ameri- 
cans really  mean  by  democracy.  De- 
mocracy has  been  defined  by  Mr.  Bal- 
four as  a  government  in  which  the  ulti- 
mate control  lies  with  the  people.  It  is 
obvious  that  Mr.  Balfour's  definition  is> 


DEMOCRACY  137 

wide  enough  to  embrace  a  great  many 
forms  of  government  other  than  repub- 
lics. In  political  theory  the  ultimate 
control  lies  with  the  people  in  many 
European  kingdoms;  but  in  England 
above  its  democracy,  is  a  great  political 
aristocracy  which,  disguise  it  as  we  may, 
arrogates  to  itself  in  some  way  the  su- 
preme and  perpetual  direction  of  the 
Government.  To  some  modern  Ameri- 
cans the  Government  of  England  is 
therefore  not  a  pure  democracy.  What 
most  Americans  mean  by  democracy  is 
a  government  where  there  are  no  class 
distinctions  and  where  the  people  rule 
not  ultimately,  but  primarily  and  all  the 
time.  Such  was  the  Jeffersonian  con- 
ception of  American  democracy.  With 
a  simple  and  homogeneous  people  such 
as  Americans  were  at  the  inception  of 
the  republic,  that  form  of  democracy 
worked  admirably.    As  the  nation  has 


138     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

grown  more  complex,  the  art  of  govern- 
ment on  the  principles  of  democracy  has 
become  difficult,  and  it  is  less  certain 
that  a  government  in  which  the  people 
rule  all  the  time  is  efficient  enough  to 
weather  the  perils  which  beset  nations. 
What  many  Americans  prize  most  in 
their  democracy  is  not,  however,  the  effi- 
ciency it  produces,  but  the  kind  of  care- 
less and  unrestrained  liberty  which  they 
associate  with  their  own  form  of  democ- 
racy. Of  the  inestimable  value  of  per- 
fect, ordered  liberty  there  can  be  no 
question.  The  trouble  is  that  perfect, 
ordered  liberty  cannot  always  be  pro- 
tected or  even  maintained  without  an 
efficient  government.  Thus  the  pro- 
found problem  for  American  democracy 
is,  Can  democracy  organize  and  main- 
tain a  government  sufficiently  efficient  to 
assure  and  protect  ordered  liberty  per- 
manently?   Old-fashioned   conservative 


DEMOCRACY  139 

Americans  believe  that  in  time  democ- 
racy can  do  this.  They,  however,  rarely 
philosophize  about  their  democracy; 
they  accept  it  as  a  perfectly  natural  and 
stable  institution  for  a  great  state. 
This  is  a  favorable  sign,  for  to  be  great, 
a  state  must  be  strong  and  well  ordered. 
To  the  more  than  fifty  millions  of  na- 
tive Americans  whose  progenitors  vol- 
untarily severed  their  connections  with 
Europe  nearly  three  centuries  ago  de- 
mocracy is  not  so  much  a  political  creed 
as  a  mental  habit.  They  were  born  dem- 
ocrats and  know  nothing  else.  As 
Henry  Clay  said,  "Monarchy  in  the 
American  Colonies  before  the  Revolu- 
tion was  only  a  theory."  America  was 
of  necessity  essentially  a  democracy 
from  the  very  beginning.  Of  aristo- 
cratic or  monarchical  institutions  co- 
lonial Americans  had  no  actual  experi- 
ence.   With    privilege    and    recognized 


140     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

distinctions  of  rank  they  were  totally  un- 
familiar. It  is  significant  that  present- 
day  Americans  remain  indifferent  to  all 
titles  except  the  military.  In  America 
even  the  signs  of  authority  are  rarely 
visible.  With  the  machinery  of  their 
own  form  of  government  most  Ameri- 
cans rarely  come  into  contact.  They 
vote  at  stated  times,  and  they  take  a 
more  or  less  active  or  passive  interest  in 
the  preliminaries  which  lead  to  popular 
elections  for  public  office;  but  never 
through  their  entire  life  do  most  of  them 
come  in  contact  with  the  high  officials  of 
their  general  Government.  In  large 
portions  of  America  even  the  police,  in 
other  countries  the  most  familiar  agents 
of  governmental  authority,  are  un- 
known. Yet  all  Americans  are  dimly 
aware  that  a  great  governmental  struc- 
ture exists  at  Washington,  and  that  at 
times   it   exerts   a   tremendous   power, 


DEMOCRACY  141 

which  on  the  whole  they  believe  is  work- 
ing for  the  good  of  the  country  at  large. 
Only  in  some  vague  way  do  they  associ- 
ate their  prosperity  and  the  actual  free- 
dom they  enjoy  with  democracy. 

Up  to  this  point  of  their  history  it 
has  not  been  indispensable  for  Ameri- 
cans to  inquire  whether  or  not  democ- 
racy is  the  best  principle  for  their  coun- 
try. Let  the  Government  alter  ma- 
terially its  relations  to  the  governed,  let 
the  nation  be  utterly  vanquished  by  a 
foreign  enemy,  or  let  a  long  period  of  re- 
tarded development  intervene,  and  the 
spirit  of  inquiry  concerning  the  merits 
of  democracy  would  be  easily  aroused  in 
America.  That  the  examination  would 
be  thorough  there  is  good  reason  to  be- 
lieve, for  the  general  intelligence  of  the 
people  of  the  country  is  singularly  alert 
when  interest  and  necessity  demand  final 
and  serious  public  action. 


142     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

With  all  its  advantages  democracy, 
like  all  other  human  institutions,  is  not 
without  its  peculiar  defects.  It  is  con- 
ceded to  be  inefficient  in  particulars 
where  more  centralized  governments  are 
efficient.  As  Mr.  Balfour  has  lately  re- 
marked, democracies  require  a  very 
high  order  of  statesmanship  to  guide 
them  successfully.  The  main  defect  of 
democracies  is  that  they  are  apt  to  give 
rise  to  a  large  political  class.  Democ- 
racies generally  are  a  paradise  for  petty 
politicians.  In  modern  .  America  the 
professional  politicians  stand  almost 
apart  from  the  excellent  and  industrious 
citizens  of  the  country.  It  is  generally 
admitted  that  as  a  rule  they  do  not 
as  a  body  now  compare  favorably  with 
Americans  in  other  vocations.  Of 
course  there  are  exceptions  to  this  rule. 
A  politician  is  not  necessarily  a  dema- 
gogue or  a  corrupt  man;  but  with  a 


DEMOCRACY  143 

formidable  part  of  the  American  poli- 
ticians politics  is  a  sort  of  science  of  de- 
mocracy which  they  pervert  for  their 
own  purposes.  A  breach  of  a  private 
trust  is  always  deplorable  and  it  is  gen- 
erally condemned.  When  politicians  do 
not  consider  the  welfare  of  the  state  or 
of  the  country,  but  the  advantage  of  pub- 
lic measures  to  themselves  or  their 
party,  it  is  a  breach  of  a  public  trust. 
A  breach  of  a  public  trust  is  the  most 
serious  offense  which  can  be  committed 
against  human  society.  Yet  among  pol- 
iticians this  offense  is  not  uncommon, 
and  by  the  public  it  is  often  too  freely 
condoned. 

It  is  fortunate  that  the  most  eminent 
public  men  of  America  are  not  its  pro- 
fessional politicians.  They  are  those 
whose  mastery  of  the  science  of  govern- 
ment segregates  them  from  the  regular 
politicians   of  the   country.    By   sheer 


144     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

force  of  intellectual  eminence  a  few  pub- 
lic men  have  won  in  America  a  recog- 
nized place  in  the  national  councils. 
Without  such  men  the  condition  of  pub- 
lic affairs  would  be  hopeless  indeed. 
Fortunately,  Americans  do  not  ignore 
the  distinction  between  their  politicians 
and  their  statesmen.  They  honor  their 
statesmen  and  distrust  their  politicians. 
The  term  '^ democracy"  seems  lately 
to  have  become  in  the  public  discourse 
of  the  politicians  the  equivalent  of  the 
term  ''republic,"  and  yet  the  terms  are 
far  from  being  equivalents.  A  republic 
may  exist  without  democracy,  and  de- 
mocracy without  a  republic.  To  a  re- 
publican form  of  government  Americans, 
from  the  first  settlements  of  North 
America,  are  so  committed  that  no  other 
form  of  government  is  now  either  pos- 
sible or  consistent  with  the  national 
habits  and  the  historical  development  of 


DEMOCRACY  145 

the  country.  A  republic  flourishes  in 
America  because  it  is  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment best  suited  to  the  national  hab- 
its and  temper.  In  America  a  republic 
is  as  much  the  product  of  the  natural 
and  original  conditions  of  the  country  as 
are  its  fauna  and  flora.  A  democratic 
republic  is,  in  fact,  the  normal  govern- 
ment of  Americans.  There  is  probably 
not  a  single  American  living  who  does 
not  hope  for  the  perpetuation  of  the  es- 
tablished government.  That  no  other 
form  of  government  could  at  present 
flourish  here  is  manifest.  The  prob- 
lem is,  Will  the  conditions  which  have 
long  favored  democracy  continue?  Of 
all  the  dangers  which  beset  a  democratic 
republic,  the  greatest  is  the  multitude 
of  demagogues  and  petty  politicians 
whom  popular  governments  foster.  If 
a  radical  change  shall  ever  come  about 
in  American  political  institutions, — and 


146     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

history  proves  that  no  one  form  of  gov- 
ernment is  perpetual, — it  will  doubtless 
be  largely  due  to  the  abandoned  charac- 
ter and  the  insincerity  of  the  profes- 
sional political  class.  The  experience  of 
mankind  teaches  that  under  all  forms 
of  government  the  mass  of  the  people  is 
powerless  to  react  against  the  general 
perversion  of  the  political  class  of  the 
country  except  by  a  revolution. 

A  long  period  of  suffering  from  cor- 
ruption and  inefficiency  of  the  estab- 
lished republican  government  in  Amer- 
ica might  bring  about  a  change.  If 
through  deplorable  necessity  a  change  in 
the  constitution  of  government  shall 
ever  become  imperative  in  the  long  fu- 
ture of  the  American  nation,  it  will 
doubtless  be  due  to  the  incurable  public 
corruption  of  the  politicians  and  to  the 
consequent  breaking  down  of  the  execu- 
tive, legislative,  and  judicial  institutions 


DEMOCRACY  147 

established  by  the  Constitution.  Their 
demonstrated  incapacity  to  perform  well 
the  true  functions  of  government  might 
suddenly  bring  about  a  revolution  and 
change.  That  there  is  at  present  any 
serious  degeneration  in  American  po- 
litical institutions  impartial  observers 
do  not  detect.  The  executive  continues 
to  be  highly  intelligent,  disinterested, 
and  efficient;  the  legislative  bodies,  while 
not  free  from  all  reproach,  are  in  the 
main  fairly  representative  and  seldom 
corrupt.  The  Federal  judiciary  re- 
mains above  all  just  criticism  or  re- 
proach. That  the  various  legislative 
bodies,  the  weak  spots  of  the  Govern- 
ment, will  in  course  of  time  become  even 
more  truly  representative  of  the  more 
elevated  thought  and  desires  of  good  and 
conscientious  Americans  most  of  them 
continue  to  hope  and  trust. 

That  there  is  a  modern  tendency  to 


148     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

chicanery  and  what  the  French  call 
chantage  savant  in  American  poli- 
tics some,  perhaps  not  many,  elevated 
Americans  are  at  times  forced  to  sus- 
pect. If  this  suspicion  should  ever  ripen 
into  a  general  conviction,  it  would  be  a 
sign  of  danger  for  democracy.  The  de- 
fects referred  to  are  not,  however,  yet 
sufficiently  grave  to  constitute  a  menace 
to  existing  institutions,  but  that  they 
are  sufficient  to  constitute  a  possible 
danger  ahead  is  not  to  be  ignored.  That 
the  problems  of  the  American  form 
of  government  are  sufficiently  grave  to 
demand  greater  attention  from  the  men 
in  public  life  all  Americans  out  of  pub- 
lic life  believe.  Before  the  defects  of 
democracy  are  entirely  eradicated,  any 
attempt  to  impose  American  democracy 
as  a  system  on  foreign  states  may  be  pre- 
mature. 
A  recent  issue  of  an  American  journal, 


DEMOCRACY  149 

the  organ  of  a  religious  faith  embracing 
many  millions  of  American  citizens, 
contains  a  serious  and  a  significant  ref- 
erence to  the  democracy  of  the  American 
politicians.  This  journal  pertinently 
asks  **  whether  the  object  of  democratic 
governments  is  the  happiness,  welfare 
and  progress  of  a  nation,  or  the  mere 
perpetuation  of  democratic  institutions 
which  systematically  neglect  any  or  all 
of  these  objects  of  government."  It 
then  proceeds  to  point  out  that  democ- 
racy has  been  tried  only  by  highly  civil- 
ized and  enlightened  peoples  with  some 
measure  of  success.  It  admits  that  de- 
mocracy has  proved  up  to  the  present  to 
be  the  government  best  suited  for  Amer- 
ica, where,  although  lacking  in  efficiency, 
it  has  justified  itself  in  results.  The 
journal  adds  in  substance:  ''Democ- 
racy has  not  yet  been  able  to  impose  it- 
self on  the  world  as  a  principle,  for  it  is 


150     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

in  the  experimental  stage.  It  has  never 
yet  succeeded  with  others  than  enlight- 
ened and  fully  civilized  peoples." 
Without  the  obligation  of  accepting  or 
denying  the  truth  of  this  particular  con- 
clusion of  the  journal  in  question,  a  re- 
flecting reader  will  at  once  admit  to  him- 
self that  it  is  true  that  democracy  is  still 
on  trial  as  a  principle,  and  he  will 
naturally  conclude  that  any  effort  on  the 
part  of  Americans  of  the  present  century 
to  impose  their  own  system,  however  ad- 
mirable for  themselves,  on  other  coun- 
tries is  both  premature  and  in  direct  con- 
flict with  the  leading  principle  of  democ- 
racy itself.  A  consistent  democracy 
leaves  to  the  people  of  every  country  the 
right  to  form  their  own  government,  as 
the  English  foreign  minister,  Mr.  Bal- 
four, very  lately  said,  **  according  to 
their  own  ideas,  and  based  on  their  own 
history,  character,  and  hopes." 


DEMOCRACY  151 

The  world  has  a  very  long  history,  and 
that  American  democracy  is  even  yet  in 
the  experimental  stage  must  be  admitted 
by  every  reflecting  man.  Until  recently 
American  democracy  has  been  conserva- 
tive and  just.  The  older  democracies 
were  not  exempt  from  serious  defects. 
They  were  not  fair  to  property,  and 
therefore  perished.  Certain  recent  dem- 
ocratic theories  of  taxation,  very  much 
favored  by  the  modern  school  of  demo- 
crats, have  not  yet  been  worked  out  in 
America  in  detail.  On  the  practical  re- 
sults of  the  application  of  these  theories 
the  ultimate  fate  of  democracy  in  Amer- 
ica much  depends.  If  it  shall  be  proved 
that  the  new  theories  stifle  individual  in- 
itiative, destroy  property  and  energy, 
and  are  subversive  of  all  the  arts  and 
the  sciences  peculiar  to  high  civilization, 
it  will  be  safe  to  affirm  that  either  these 
unjust  theories  must  be  quickly  aban- 


152     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

doned  or  else  that  democracy  will  not 
establish  itself  as  a  recognized  principle 
for  the  world.  If  such  fallacious  the- 
ories of  taxation  are  persisted  in  after 
being  demonstrated  unsound,  it  is  safe 
to  affirm  that  then  it  will  be  democracy 
which  will  be  forced  to  give  way  to  some 
other  system  of  government  productive 
of  better  results  to  mankind.  A  system 
of  taxation  is  dangerous  to  the  stability 
of  government  in  exact  proportion  to  its 
injustice.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
liberty,  freedom,  and  justice  are  not  in- 
consistent with  forms  of  government 
other  than  democracies.  There  have 
been  democracies  in  the  past  which  have 
subverted  both  liberty  and  justice.  The 
great  constitutional  lawyer,  Mr.  Justice 
Story,  thought  that  democracies  could 
maintain  themselves  only  where  the 
people  were  superior  and  highly  enlight- 
ened.   His  conclusion  is  entitled  to  some 


DEMOCRACY  153 

consideration  by  thoughtful  men  even  in 
democracies,  for  he  contributed  much  to- 
ward the  success  of  the  republic  insti- 
tuted by  the  established  democracy  of 
America. 

Doubtless  Americans  are  justified  thus 
far  in  regarding  their  own  political  in- 
stitutions as  the  best  for  themselves,  for 
no  other  form  of  government  has  ever 
produced  for  so  long  a  period  so  much 
happiness  among  so  many  people  in  so 
great  an  extent  of  country.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  highly  inexpedient  for  Ameri- 
can democracy  to  endeavor  to  force  de- 
mocracy as  a  principle  at  this  time  on  the 
other  nations  of  the  world.  No  mon- 
archical nation  would  be  willing  to  ac- 
cept its  political  institutions  from  a  for- 
eign power.  Nor  can  a  foreign  country 
be  forced  even  by  a  successful  war  to  act 
against  the  national  predilections,  cus- 
toms, and  traditions.    Nothing  so  cer- 


154     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

tainly  tends  to  the  perpetuation  of  mon- 
archy in  Europe  at  the  present  time  as 
the  proclamation  of  a  democratic  power 
that  a  particular  monarchical  country 
must  accept  democracy  as  a  principle. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  American 
proclamation  of  democracy  as  a  uni- 
versal principle  of  government  is  dis- 
quieting to  those  of  our  own  allies  whose 
regime  is  aristocratical,  if  not  abso- 
lutely monarchical.  It  takes  no  note  of 
the  real  strength  of  European  aristocra- 
cies at  the  present  time.  Lord  North- 
cliffe  has  evidently  detected  this  danger, 
for  he  has  announced  that  America  is 
not  now  fighting  for  democracy  (''Cur- 
rent Opinion  Magazine"  for  October, 
1917).  In  Europe  the  aristocracies, 
while  having  undergone  a  great  inherent 
change,  still  possess  a  commanding  in- 
fluence in  all  European  states.  Some 
years    since    a    distinguished    French 


DEMOCRACY  155 

writer,  Count  Melchior  de  Vogiie,  well 
pointed  out  the  radical  changes  which 
had  taken  place  in  the  modem  constitu- 
tions of  European  aristocracies. 

Although  aristocracies  of  any  kind 
may  be  distasteful  to  Americans,  they 
ought  not  to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  fact 
that  the  aristocratic  classes  are  in  Eu- 
rope still  strongly  intrenched  and  greatly 
respected  by  most  Europeans.  The 
aristocracies  of  Europe,  however  now 
constituted,  are  seriously  attached  to 
monarchical  institutions,  which  they 
naturally  associate  with  the  ideals  that 
they  most  cherish  in  life.  In  order  to 
abolish  monarchy  in  Europe  it  will  be 
necessary  to  uproot  the  whole  social  or- 
der of  all  European  states  except  Swit- 
zerland. An  American  propaganda  for 
democracy  outside  of  America  is  there- 
fore inexpedient,  as  it  tends  to  shock  and 
alienate  the  aristocratic  classes  in  the 


156     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

various  countries  of  the  European  allies 
of  America.  In  Europe  the  aristocracy 
as  a  body  is  evidently  beginning  to  won- 
der where  the  entente  with  America  is 
leading  them,  and,  if  the  truth  were 
known,  the  American  proclamation  of 
democracy  as  a  universal  principle  is  be- 
coming a  powerful  influence  in  Europe 
for  a  speedy  peace.  Many  Europeans, 
quite  outside  of  Germany  and  Austria, 
begin  to  see  that  if  the  Hapsburgs  and 
the  HohenzoUerns  are  to  be  forcibly 
ejected  from  their  hereditary  kingdoms, 
the  royal  houses  of  Windsor,  Savoy, 
Spain,  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden 
will  soon  be  expelled.  Now,  the  govern- 
ing aristocracies  of  all  these  countries 
are  by  no  means  ready  to  abdicate,  nor 
are  their  kings,  whatever  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  his  followers  may  have  in 
contemplation  for  England's  particular 
royalties.    It  is  a  formidable  undertak- 


DEMOCRACY  157 

ing  for  America  to  attempt  to  establish 
a  universal  democracy  on  the  debris  of 
the  last  of  the  thrones  of  Europe. 

Nor  can  Americans  afford  to  disre- 
gard the  fact  that  even  in  republican 
France  there  still  exists  a  powerful  aris- 
tocratic class  who,  while  ever  loyal  to 
France,  never  allow  themselves  in  times 
of  peace  to  come  into  personal  contact 
with  the  officialdom  of  the  republic.  The 
old  French  aristocracy  still  believe,  as 
Bismarck  believed,  that  a  republic  is  not 
the  most  formidable  government  in  a 
military  sense  for  France,  They  are 
convinced  that  republican  politics  lead 
to  corruption  and  tend  to  weaken 
France.  The  old  French  aristocracy, 
in  other  words,  do  not  believe  in  the 
principle  of  democracy.  Americans 
should  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  not  abso- 
lutely impossible  that  in  some  circum- 
stances France  may  yet  become  a  mon- 


158     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

arcliy  and  join  some  future  league  of  the 
kings.  It  is  quite  significant  that  even 
the  most  advanced  republican  officials  in 
France  have  had  the  moderation  to  rec- 
ognize that,  so  long  as  the  existing  dem- 
ocratic institutions  of  France  are  not 
threatened  directly  from  without,  the  po- 
litical principles  of  foreign  states  should 
not  be  provoked  by  France  even  in  time 
of  war.  Concerning  the  revolution  in 
Russia,  official  France  has  been  notably 
reticent.  The  action  of  America  has 
been  otherwise,  and  not  in  accordance 
with  American  precedent.  A  revolution 
in  Russia  is  not  necessarily  a  democratic 
manifestation. 

After  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  prov- 
inces from  Spain,  the  United  States 
thought  it  decorous  to  wait  five  years 
before  any  formal  recognition  of  their 
independence.  Whether  the  future  Gov- 
ernment of  Russia,  as  it  shall  be  ulti- 


DEMOCRACY  159 

mately  reorganized,  raay  not  take  excep- 
tion and  umbrage  to  the  speedy  recogni- 
tion by  America  of  the  Revolution  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  The  pendency  of  the 
Great  War  is  the  justification,  doubtless, 
for  the  prompt  American  action  toward 
the  Russian  Revolution.  It  would  seem 
unfortunate  that  it  was  not  possible  for 
America  to  cooperate  with  the  Russian 
military  authorities  in  their  offensive 
against  Germany  without  the  necessity 
of  a  recognition  of  the  Revolution  before 
some  form  of  government  that  showed 
greater  indications  of  permanency  had 
been  erected  in  Russia.  It  is  apparent 
that  the  Republic  of  France  has  been 
more  cautious  in  its  attitude  toward  the 
Revolution  in  Russian,  while  the  democ- 
racy of  England  has  spoken  with  hesita- 
tion. The  long  holding  back  in  London 
of  the  first  American  despatches  from 
"Washington  to  Russia  would  seem  to  in- 


160     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

dicate  some  doubt  on  the  part  of  the 
English  authorities  about  the  wisdom  of 
the  speedy  American  indorsement  of  the 
Russian  Revolution. 

So  long  as  the  principle  of  democracy 
in  America  is  not  questioned  by  Euro- 
peans, it  is  impolitic  for  America  to  chal- 
lenge the  principle  of  monarchy  in  Eu- 
rope. If  Europe  becomes  restless  or  re- 
sentful of  American  influence,  monarchy 
as  a  principle  will  quickly  reincorpo- 
rate itself  with  the  aid  of  the  powerful 
European  aristocracy.  It  may  then  con- 
clude that  its  own  favorite  institutions 
cannot  survive  if  menaced  overtly  by  the 
American  democracy.  It  is  not  impos- 
sible that  in  that  event  America  will  be 
plagued  by  a  powerful  European  coali- 
tion endeavoring  to  undermine  it  in  all 
directions.  America  has  no  proper  con- 
cern with  democracy  as  a  principle  of 
government  except  in  so  far  as  it  relates 


DEMOCRACY  161 

to  America.  In  America  democracy  has 
the  right  and  the  duty  to  maintain  itself 
by  every  means  in  its  power,  but  it  is  im- 
politic for  America  to  project  itself  un- 
necessarily against  the  monarchical  pre- 
dilections and  traditions  of  Europeans. 
America  cannot  afford  to  occupy  the  po- 
sition of  provocateur  of  European  revo- 
lutions. It  is  a  maxim  that  ''revolu- 
tions often  react  and  devour  their 
nurses.*^  The  freedom  and  security  of 
Americans  are  too  important  to  be  jeop- 
arded by  hostile  and  intrusive  asser- 
tions of  Americans  that  democracy  is  the 
only  proper  governmental  principle. 

Wise  Americans  do  not  forget  that 
democracy  has  ndt  yet  solved  in  America 
some  of  the  peculiar  problems  of  popu- 
lar government  which  require  a  longer 
period  of  time  for  their  proper  solution. 
The  efficient  government  of  great  cities 
on  the  principle  of  democracy  is  only  one 


162     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

of  the  many  existing  problems  of  de- 
mocracy. The  comparatively  new  civic 
communities  in  America  have  not  had 
time  to  create  a  civic  spirit.  It  is 
thought  that  it  takes  500  years  to  con- 
solidate and  train  any  civic  community. 
But,  whatever  the  reason  may  be,  thus 
far  democracy  has  not  solved  in  America 
the  problem  of  the  orderly  and  the  eco- 
nomic government  of  great  cities.  Un- 
der no  other  form  of  government  is  the 
administration  of  great  municipalities 
so  bad  and  so  extravagant  as  it  is  in 
America.  Unjust  and  excessive  munici- 
pal assessments  and  taxation,  the  ex- 
ploitation of  the  municipal  resources  by 
designing  demagogues,  a  general  waste- 
ful extravagance,  and  an  ineffective  po- 
lice are  familiar  spectacles  in  the  larger 
American  cities.  These  things  threaten 
property  and  menace  the  prosperity  of 
the  whole  country.    Peaceable,  old-fash- 


DEMOCRACY  163 

ioned  citizens  of  districts  adjacent  to 
large  cities  in  America  have  been  ac- 
tually ruined  by  the  unjust  exploitations 
of  the  municipal  authorities.  Their  out- 
lying lands  have  been  taken  from  them 
through  unjust  assessments  fomented  by 
civic  political  exploiters,  and  no  ade- 
quate redress  has  as  yet  been  discovered 
for  this  form  of  municipal  injustice. 
Of  all  governments  the  municipal  is 
that  which  touches  most  closely  the  wel- 
fare of  the  people,  and  it  is  most  impor- 
tant to  them  that  it  should  be  good  and 
efficient. 

Until  the  democratic  municipal  gov- 
ernments of  America  are  made  far  bet- 
ter, as  they  doubtless  will  be  and  must 
be  in  the  course  of  time,  American 
democracy  has  no  complete  title  to  jus- 
tify itself  as  a  general  principle  for  the 
world.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  de- 
mocracy will  be  able  to  solve  its  munici- 


164     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

pal  problems  only  after  a  much  longer 
period  of  time.  Meanwhile  democracy 
in  America  will  have  problems  enough  of 
its  own  without  undertaking  to  spread 
democracy  as  a  principle  throughout 
Europe. 

The  inefficiency  of  democracy  as  a 
principle  of  government  was  lately  em- 
phasized by  the  disclosure  of  the  de- 
plorable situation  of  the  shipping  of  the 
United  States.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  war  in  1914  America,  with  a 
coast-line  far  greater  than  that  of  any 
country  in  Europe  and  with  a  large  mari- 
time population  once  training  and  send- 
ing to  sea  the  most  skilful  sailors  in  the 
world,  had  virtually  no  merchant  ship- 
ping. Her  coast  people,  who  naturally 
follow  the  sea,  had  deserted  it.  Why 
this  was  puzzled  thoughtful  Americans. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  there  has  long 
been  a  great  shipping  trust,  representing 


DEMOCRACY  165 

all  the  large  European  companies,  Eng- 
lish, French,  and  German  alike.  It  is 
said  that  the  shipping  laws  of  America 
have  been  made  in  the  interest  of  the  for- 
eign shipping  trusts  and  not  in  the  inter- 
est of  the  American  nation.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  this  explanation  ought  not  to 
be  accepted  without  proof,  for  it  may  be 
an  unjust  reflection  on  Congress.  That 
the  destruction  of  American  shipping  is 
due  to  other  causes  than  corruption  in 
Congress  is  the  better  and  more  conserv- 
ative opinion.  Unfortunately,  that  ex- 
planation reflects  on  the  capacity  for 
government  of  democracy. 

With  all  its  defects,  educated  and  in- 
fluential Americans  of  the  best  tradi- 
tional type  believe  that  democracy  is  a 
necessary  principle  of  free  government 
in  America.  They  continue  to  hope  and 
believe  that  the  manifest  defects  in  the 
operation  of  the  democratic  political  in- 


166     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

stitutions  of  America  can  and  will  be 
obviated  in  time.  But  the  wisest  of  them 
are  convinced  that  the  principle  of 
'  *  America  for  the  Americans ' '  is  endan- 
gered by  any  premature  attempt  of 
Americans  to  impose  the  principle  of 
democracy  at  this  time  on  the  govern- 
ments of  Europe  as  a  world  principle. 
America  is  making  war  against  Ger- 
many not  to  extend  democracy  or  the 
peculiar  institutions  of  America,  but,  as 
Lord  Northcliffe  has  rightly  conjectured, 
in  order  to  defend  American  nationality 
and  American  freedom  against  the  as- 
saults of  a  formidable  and  unscrupulous 
foreign  enemy.  That  America  will  and 
must  succeed  in  the  war  admits  of  no 
doubt ;  but  in  order  to  succeed  it  is  quite 
unnecessary  for  Americans  to  obscure 
the  plain  issue  with  Germany  by  the  dis- 
cussion of  a  political  philosophy  not  yet 
complete. 


DEMOCRACY  167 

The  time  is  doubtless  coming  in  the 
world  when  the  security  of  a  personal 
liberty  will  be  a  first  principle  of  all 
governments,  no  matter  what  form  they 
may  assume.  Tyrannies  everjnvhere 
will  pass  away  forever.  Monarchies 
will  be  as  liberal  and  as  free  as  republics. 
A  more  intelligent  and  trained  public 
will  no  longer  in  any  country  be  deluded 
by  mere  oratorical  phrases.  Govern- 
ments of  all  kinds  will  be  recognized  as 
an  intricate  business,  and  they  will  be 
given  over  to  the  most  capable,  the  most 
efficient,  and  the  best  trained.  The 
United  States  will  then  form  no  excep- 
tion to  a  universal  principle.  It  will  be- 
come more  practical  and  less  idealistic. 
The  demagogues  and  the  visionaries  in 
America  will  then  be  required  by  an  in- 
telligent public  to  yield  their  influence 
to  more  capable  men.  Then  only  will 
liberty  be  well  ordered  and  permanent 


168     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

in  the  world,  and  democracy  triumph  as 
a  universal  principle.  When  this  comes 
about  there  will  be  no  need  of  an  Ameri- 
can crusade  to  impose  the  principles  of 
democracy  on  the  world.  The  world 
will  then  be  safe  for  democracy  and  de- 
mocracy safe  for  the  world. 

Since  America  has  declared  war 
against  Germany  the  conduct  of  its  de- 
mocracy has  justilBied  the  expectations  of 
the  most  ardent  Americans.  Democracy 
in  the  United  States  has  thus  far  dis- 
played a  loyalty  and  a  quiet  dignity  ri- 
valing France.  It  has  submitted  to  un- 
precedented and  drastic  military  meas- 
ures of  the  Government  without  a  mur- 
mur and  with  a  readiness  and  loyalty  not 
exceeded  in  the  German  Empire.  With 
such  a  citizenship  any  Government  may 
be  well  satisfied.  This  conduct  of  the 
American  people  points  to  a  long  reign 
of  order  under  the  republic.    But  the 


DEMOCRACY  169 

real  test  of  democracy  and  republican 
institutions  will  come  after  the  war, 
when  the  politicians  begin  again  their 
mischievous  appeals  for  total  disarma- 
ment and  for  the  neglect  of  our  war  de- 
fensive with  the  hope  of  capturing  a  dis- 
contented and  impoverished  people.  If 
democracy  passes  through  the  ordeal 
safely,  proves  conservative,  and  con- 
tinues to  exhibit  an  intelligent  and  ele- 
vated political  outlook,  discarding  the 
coming  socialistic  program  of  the  ex- 
treme political  demagogues,  the  republic 
will  be  safe  for  a  long,  a  conservative, 
and  an  interesting  future.  It  will,  how- 
ever, be  compelled  to  correct  that  fatal 
defect  of  democracies — excessive  gov- 
ernmental extravagance  in  the  wrong  di- 
rection. "While  America  has  been  able 
to  stand  up  in  the  past  despite  the  gross 
extravagance  of  its  governmental  ma- 
chine, the  time  is  coming  when  a  non- 


170     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

productive  extravagance  in  the  wrong 
directions  will  have  to  cease  if  democ- 
racy is  to  prove  permanent.  If  the  at- 
titude of  the  American  democracy 
proves  as  correct  toward  the  notorious 
improvidence  of  the  politicians  at  Wash- 
ington as  it  has  thus  far  proved  toward 
the  pending  war,  democracy  will  have 
vindicated  itself  completely,  and  the  re- 
public will  be  safe  for  a  long  time  to 
come. 


CHAPTER  XI 

AN   AMERICAN    MERCHANT   MARINE 

There  can  be  no  more  imperative  duty 
than  that  immediately  after  the  pres- 
ent war  the  American  Government  shall, 
cost  what  it  may,  speedily  revive  its 
merchant  marine.  Once  the  acknowl- 
edged mistress  of  the  seas,  America  is 
now  bound  hand  and  foot  by  the  great 
foreign  ship-owning  powers  of  the  world. 
It  is  thus  rendered  helpless  in  war,  and 
placed  in  times  of  peace  at  unnecessary 
disadvantage.  Even  the  Government 
mails  and  the  private  despatches  are 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  foreigners,  as 
America  has  no  fast  mail-ships  of  its 
171 


172     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

own.  Almost  every  ton  of  freight  pro- 
duced in  America  pays  rich  tolls  to  aliens 
and  is  covered  in  transit  by  strange  flags. 
American  merchants  are  thus  placed  by 
a  government  policy,  as  wrong  as  impol- 
itic, at  the  mercy  of  foreign  ship-owners, 
while  Americans  citizens  are  humiliated 
by  being  forced  to  seek  passage  on  for- 
eign vessels  even  when  approaching  or 
quitting  their  own  shores.  And  yet 
America  claims  to  be  one  of  the  richest 
and  most  advanced  countries  of  the 
world.  Why  is  it  that  its  sea-borne  com- 
merce is  deliberately  handed  over  to  for- 
eigners, its  defensive  warfare  allowed  to 
be  paralyzed,  and  its  citizens  driven 
from  the  gainful  occupation  of  the  seas? 
A  government  policy  which  suffers  these 
things  is  as  incompetent  as  it  is  unwise. 
Until  this  particular  wrong  to  American 
citizens  is  remedied,  America  cannot  be 
reckoned  among  the  great  and  formid- 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE      173 

able  powers  of  the  world.  Any  of  the 
great  foreign  governments  may  at  will 
interdict  or  impede  American  trade. 
This  the  American  Government  can  pre- 
vent only  by  the  reestablishment  of  its 
once  prosperous  merchant  marine. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  republic  the 
merchant  marine  and  the  foreign  com- 
merce of  America  were  sedulously  and 
intelligently  protected  and  fostered  by 
the  American  Government.  The  deep- 
sea  fisheries,  those  nurseries  of  the 
navy,  were  until  1866  encouraged  by 
special  bounties.  The  result  of  this  pro- 
tection was  that  America  gained  the  War 
of  1812  on  the  seas,  although  the  victory 
was  waived  by  the  Treaty  of  Ghent, 
which  in  effect  repealed  the  laws  favor- 
able to  the  American  merchant  marine. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  Federal  statute 
of  1817,  still  in  force,  which  closed  coast- 
wise conamerce  to  foreigners,  America 


174     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

to-day  would  have  barely  a  ship  left  on 
the  high  seas.  Between  the  years  1830 
and  1838  the  American  merchant  marine 
somewhat  flourished  because  American 
wooden  ships  could  be  built  more  cheaply 
and  American  mariners  were  acknowl- 
edged to  be  the  most  skilful  afloat.  But 
with  the  coming  of  steam  power  and  iron 
and  steel  ships  all  this  natural  advantage 
was  lost.  In  1858,  when  it  was  proposed 
to  remedy  the  condition,  the  Southern 
slave-owners  began  openly  to  play  into 
the  hands  of  the  foreign  shipmasters  and 
to  oppose  any  governmental  encourage- 
ment necessary  to  enable  American  ship- 
masters to  compete  with  the  cheaper- 
manned  and  -built  foreign  ships.  This 
Southern  opposition  is  now  thought  by 
well-informed  men  to  have  been  the  first 
move  of  the  Secessionist  party  in  the 
United  States. 
In  President  Cleveland's  administra- 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE     175 

tion,  to  which  the  modern  American 
Navy  owes  so  much,  it  was  made  evident 
that  something  must  be  done  to  restore 
the  American  merchant  marine.  Ac- 
cordingly the  act  of  1845,  authorizing  the 
Federal  Government  to  contract  for  car- 
rying the  mails  on  American  ships,  was 
substantially  reenacted  in  1891 ;  but 
unfortunately  the  act  of  1891  did  not 
offer  sufficient  encouragement  to  Ameri- 
can shipmasters.  In  1912,  foreign-built 
ships  at  last  became  entitled,  after  a  long 
opposition,  to  American  registry,  but  the 
higher  American  operating  scale  frus- 
trated also  this  law.  The  tariff  biU  of 
1913  was  on  sound  principles.  It  gave  a 
five  per  cent,  discount  of  duties  on  mer- 
chandise imported  in  American  bottoms ; 
but  the  act  was  rendered  futile  by  the 
favored-nation  clauses  in  all  American 
treaties.  It  is  intimated  that  Congress 
realized  this  when  the  law  was  enacted 


176     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

and  that  it  was  intended  to  be  inopera- 
tive. 

When  the  present  war  broke  out  in 
1914  the  shocking  condition  of  the  Amer- 
ican merchant  marine  was  brought  f  orci- 
oly  home  to  Americans.  All  the  foreign 
commerce  immediately  retired  from 
America,  and  America  had  virtually  no 
ships  of  its  own.  It  was  then  proposed 
by  patriotic  Americans  to  buy  all  the 
foreign  ships  in  sight,  but  this  '*  dollar 
project"  was  immediately  frustrated  by 
foreign  nations  as  well  as  by  princi- 
ples of  the  international  laws  of  war. 
Withal,  the  war  would  have  quickly  re- 
vived shipbuilding  and  American  ship- 
ping had  it  not  been  for  the  enactment  of 
the  **La  Follette- Alexander  Bill,"  one  of 
the  worst  pieces  of  demagogic  class  legis- 
lation the  world  has  ever  beheld.  This 
measure  enabled  American  sailors  to  de- 
sert at  will,  while  it  prevented  replacing 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE     177 

them  with  such  sailors  as  are  freely  em- 
ployed by  both  English  and  French  ship- 
masters. By  the  enactment  of  useless 
and  unwise  details  the  bill  made  the  op- 
erating cost  of  American  ships  so  ex- 
cessively dear  that  no  freights  whatever 
could  be  earned  by  American-owned  ves- 
sels. The  La  Follette-Alexander  Bill 
should  have  been  entitled  **a  bill  for 
driving  American  ships  off  the  high 
seas."  Passed  on  November  4,  1914, 
this  iniquitous  law  has  rapidly  driven 
the  remnant  of  American  commerce  off 
the  seas.  It  handed  over  the  Pacific 
commerce  to  Japan.  A  more  wicked  and 
a  more  unpatriotic  measure  than  the  La 
Follette-Alexander  Bill  has  never  been 
enacted  by  Congress.  It  is  obvious  that, 
unless  this  sort  of  legislation  is  soon  put 
a  stop  to.  Congress  ought  to  give  place 
to  a  more  efficient  kind  of  legislature. 
The  Americans  are  a  patient  people,  but 


178     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

they  are  impatient  in  the  end  when  re- 
form is  necessary.  If  necessary,  they 
will  reform  Congress  or  any  other  gov- 
ernmental organ  which  stands  persist- 
ently in  the  way  of  national  progress. 
Possibly  it  cannot  be  said  with  accuracy 
that  the  neglect  of  the  American  mer- 
chant marine  is  the  result  of  deliber- 
ate treachery  to  American  institutions. 
That  it  is  a  manifestation  of  a  certain 
sort  of  inept  demagogy  which  often  pro- 
duces  in  popular  governments  very  bad 
results  for  the  time  being  is,  however, 
evident. 

To  employ  a  euphemism,  the  worst  has 
not  been  said  concerning  this  ''mistaken 
policy"  of  the  American  Congress.  In 
time  of  war  a  great  merchant  marine  is 
indispensable  to  many  successful  mili- 
tary operations.  Without  the  aid  of 
merchant  shipping  battles  may  be  lost 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE      179 

and  the  country  subjugated  by  a  foreign 
power. 

The  rapid  transport  of  troops  by  sea  is 
a  military  necessity.  It  can  be  accom- 
plished rapidly  only  by  the  employment 
of  the  national  mercantile  marine.  To 
operate  as  an  efficient  auxiliary  to  the 
defense  of  the  nation  the  merchant  ma- 
rine must  be  kept  always  in  a  state  of 
the  highest  efficiency;  the  gross  tonnage 
must  be  large,  and  the  individual  ships 
speedy  and  roomy.  Three  gross  tons  is 
reckoned  the  minimum  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  a  soldier  and  ten  gross  tons  the 
minimum  for  a  horse.  In  1914—15  Ger- 
many had  5,090,331  gross  tons  of  steel 
merchant  shipping  capable  of  landing  at 
least  1,000,000  soldiers  with  adequate 
supplies  on  any  enemy  coast  within  a 
brief  time.  England  was  far  better  sup- 
plied with  transport  facilities,  having 


180     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

nearly  21,000,000  gross  tons.  The  con- 
dition of  the  United  States  was  negligi- 
ble. It  was  not  adequate  to  convey  rap- 
idly by  sea  even  the  small  army  neces- 
sary for  the  defense  of  the  Panama 
Canal  or  Cuba.  A  hostile  occupation  of 
Cuba  by  an  enemy  force  might  prove  fa- 
tal to  the  United  States,  and,  what  is 
more,  easy  of  accomplishment  by  a  great 
European  power  at  war  with  America. 
A  merchant  marine  in  time  of  war  is 
essential  for  the  collection  of  war  ma- 
terial. America  procures  from  Chile 
most  of  the  sodium  nitrate  from  which  is 
made  nitric  acid,  essential  to  the  manu- 
facture of  guncotton  and  smokeless  pow- 
der. Perhaps  a  hundred  highly  desir- 
able articles  for  war  material,  not  all  of 
them  indispensable,  are  derived  from 
foreign  countries,  and  can  be  conveyed 
in  times  of  war  only  in  domestic  bottoms 
properly  convoyed.    In  a  hundred  ways 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE     181 

a  nation  deprived  of  a  mercantile  marine 
by  bad  laws  is  placed  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage in  times  of  war  as  in  times  of 
peace. 

In  1865  American  deep-water  tonnage 
carried  seventy  per  cent,  of  its  exports 
and  sixty-five  per  cent,  of  its  imports. 
But  in  1914  almost  all  the  exports  and 
imports  of  America  were  carried  by 
foreigners,  who  thrived  with  the  profits 
paid  to  them  by  the  American  producers. 
Thus  the  millions  of  freight  moneys 
which  should  have  found  their  way  into 
American  banks  were  deposited  in  Lon- 
don and  Berlin. 

After  the  war,  if  America  would  re- 
main at  a  high  stage  of  national  effi- 
ciency, the  present  laws  affecting  its  mer- 
chant marine  must  be  speedily  altered. 
There  is  doubtless  in  America  a  popular 
disapproval  of  bounties  and  subsidies 
to  American  shipmasters.    This  spirit, 


182     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

correct  in  the  abstract,  is  much  per- 
verted  and  encouraged  by  demagogic  pol- 
iticians, who  prefer  to  waste  the  public 
moneys  in  grossly  extravagant  expendi- 
tures more  directly  profitable  to  them- 
selves or  their  constituents.  A  well-di- 
rected campaign  of  education  may  be 
necessary  to  prove  to  the  people  of  the 
interior  of  America  that  a  great  mer- 
chant marine  is  essential  to  their  protec- 
tion and  to  the  prosperity  of  the  whole 
nation.  Americans  learn  quickly,  and 
they  can  be  made  to  unlearn  as  quickly,  if 
desired.  When  they  come  to  perceive 
that  the  nation  can  be  neither  strong  nor 
highly  prosperous  without  a  merchant 
marine,  they  will  readily  consent  to  all 
measures  necessary  for  the  upbuilding 
and  the  maintenance  of  American  ship- 
ping. 

The  merchant  marines  of  all  the  great 
powers  have  been  built  and  maintained 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE      183 

by  bounties,  favorable  discounts,  or  sub- 
sides. The  greater  European  govern- 
ments are  most  liberal  to  their  ship-own- 
ers and  to  the  national  shipping  inter- 
ests generally.  This  policy  is  not  ani- 
mated by  a  desire  to  favor  ship-owners, 
qua  ship-owners,  but  to  strengthen  and 
fortify  the  whole  nation.  England  has 
led  the  way  in  the  development  of  Eng- 
lish shipping  by  liberal  subventions  or 
bounties  to  English  ships  built  on  certain 
lines  and  convertible  into  armed  cruisers. 
The  English  Government  has  not  hesi- 
tated to  make  large  advances  of  the  pub- 
lic funds  to  English  companies  engaged 
in  the  business  of  overseas  transporta- 
tion. English  postal  subsidies  to  the 
fast  English  steamship  lines  are  most 
liberal.  In  fact,  the  whole  scheme  of  the 
law  of  England  is  designed  to  foster  for- 
eign commerce  in  English-built  ships. 
Germany,  France,  and  Japan  all  subsi- 


184     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

dize  in  one  way  and  another  the  ships  un- 
der their  flags.  They  recognize  by  their 
laws  the  fundamental  importance  of  sea- 
borne commerce  under  the  national  flag. 
The  time  has  come  when  America  must 
do  the  same  or  grow  weaker  and  weaker 
as  a  power. 

If  American  ship-builders  are  at  a  nat- 
ural disadvantage,  it  must  be  overcome 
by  necessary  legislation.  If  the  cost  of 
maintenance  of  American  ships  is 
greater  by  reason  of  the  greater  cost  of 
labor,  or  because  of  the  unjust  demands 
of  labor-unions,  then  the  American  Gov- 
ernment which  tolerates  such  things 
must  foot  the  bill  in  the  interest  of  the 
whole  nation  and  a  determined  national 
policy.  Nothing  will  pay  the  nation  bet- 
ter than  large  and  liberal  encouragement 
to  American  ship-builders  and  American 
ship-owners.  Such  a  policy  will  in  all 
probability  result  in  the  ultimate  inde- 


A  MERCHANT  MARINE      185 

pendence  of  the  ship  industries  of  the 
country.  In  the  end  they  will  be  made 
self-supporting,  for  shipmasters  always 
fear  to  rely  on  the  Government's  con- 
tinuing liberality.  They  naturally  seek 
to  become  independent  and  self-support- 
ing. 

Cost  the  nation  what  it  may,  there  can 
be  no  better  investment  of  the  public 
funds  than  in  the  support  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  American  mercantile  ma- 
rine. When  stately  American  ships 
cover  every  sea,  when  ocean  greyhounds, 
American  bred,  carry  Americans  more 
swiftly  and  safely  than  the  mail-boats  of 
other  nations;  when  the  American  flag 
floats  proudly  in  every  foreign  port, 
then,  and  not  until  then,  will  America 
be  a  supremely  great  power.  May  that 
day  speedily  come! 


CHAPTER  XII 

PREPABEDNESS 

The  worst  foes  of  a  long  era  of  peace 
for  the  world  are  the  idealists  known  as 
extreme  pacifists  and  the  socialistic 
dreamers.  These  fantastic  thinkers  for- 
get that  man  is  a  dominating  and  a  fight- 
ing being.  In  peace  man  struggles  for 
mastery  and  success  in  human  society; 
his  victories  in  peace  are  the  results  of 
the  lesser  forces  skilfully  employed  in  a 
warfare  of  a  social  variety.  Collec- 
tively, men  love  warfare  more  than 
peace.  The  will  to  dominate,  which  can- 
not be  eradicated  from  human  nature, 
impels  men,  combined  in  nations,  to  the 
use  of  the  major  forces  whenever  they 

186 


PREPAREDNESS  187 

are  necessary  to  attain  national  domina- 
tion. The  weapons  employed  in  national 
force  are  called  ''armaments."  If  na- 
tions were  to  disarm  by  agreement,  they 
would  soon  improvise  the  more  primi- 
tive weapons  necessary  to  enable  them  to 
carry  out  their  new  schemes  of  national 
domination.  Battles  might  for  a  time  be 
less  scientific,  but  human  ingenuity 
would  make  them  hardly  less  sanguinary 
or  less  savage.  It  is  idle  to  think  that 
wars  would  be  avoided  because  of  na- 
tional disarmaments.  New  and  cheaper 
arms  hastily  improvised  would  be  sub- 
stituted for  the  abandoned  armaments, 
but  wars  would  not  cease,  and  will  never 
cease,  while  mankind  remain  masterful 
and  contending  beings.  If  nations  were 
disarmed,  the  numerically  weak  nation 
would  be  placed  at  a  greater  disadvan- 
tage. The  nations  of  millions  would 
soon  overcome  and  depress  the  nations 


188     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

of  thousands  by  the  very  force  of  num- 
bers. Disarmament,  to  be  effectual, 
would  require  the  redistribution  of  coun- 
tries into  districts  of  equal  content. 

The  men  termed ' '  pacifists ' '  are  of  two 
varieties:  those  who  would  promote 
peace  by  sensible  endeavor,  and  those 
who  believe  that  wars  may  be  eradicated 
by  some  scheme  of  universal  disarma- 
ment or  the  total  neglect  of  military  ed- 
ucation. The  second  kind  of  pacifists 
are  called  "extreme  pacifists"  because 
they  believe  that  every  warlike  prepara- 
tion is  a  moral  offense.  Extreme  paci- 
fists, in  the  very  face  of  danger  to  their 
country,  would  consent  to  render  it  an 
easy  prey  for  the  enemy.  Of  all  dan- 
gers to  the  state  the  extreme  pacifists 
are  the  greatest.  Every  cultivated  or 
thoughtful  man  is  in  some  degree  a  paci- 
fist. He  loves  peace  and  he  believes  in 
the  substitution  of  arbitration  for  force 


PREPAREDNESS  189 

in  the  greatest  possible  number  of  inter- 
national differences.  But  he  recognizes 
that  some  national  differences  can  be 
solved  in  only  one  way,  and  that  way  is 
by  the  employment  of  the  national  force 
in  war.  There  have  been  wars  from  the 
very  morning  of  history,  and  there  will 
be  wars  until  the  night  sets  in  for  all 
mankind.  There  is  not  in  Europe  or  in 
Asia  a  single  eminent  statesman  who  be- 
lieves for  one  instant  that  warfare  will 
ever  be  a  thing  of  the  past. 

Preparedness  has  to  do  with  the  na- 
tional necessity  called  war.  If  a  nation 
is  right-minded,  and  there  are  nations 
which  are  not  so,  the  extremity  of  war 
will  be  avoided  whenever  possible.  But 
whenever  a  war  is  inevitable,  a  right- 
minded  nation  will  be  prepared  to  meet 
it,  and  that  kind  of  nation  will  survive  in 
the  struggle  for  human  existence.  If  a 
nation  neglects  preparation  for  war,  and 


190     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

leaves  itself  exposed  to  every  hostile  ag- 
gression, that  nation  will  be  extermi- 
nated pursuant  to  the  law  which  dooms 
all  weaker  beings  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence. A  nation  which  neglects  pre- 
paredness is  a  weak  or  a  decadent  na- 
tion; it  is  a  nation  which  lacks  sense  of 
proportion,  one  where  the  pursuit  of 
wrong  ideals  has  dulled  the  national  in- 
telligence. It  is  a  nation  which  has  de- 
cided to  neglect  its  progeny  and  its  fu- 
ture. Deliberately  such  a  nation  has 
chosen  to  be  trampled  on  in  the  end  by 
the  more  aggressive  and  the  more  endur- 
ing types  of  men  and  nations.  America 
is  not  such  a  nation.  It  will  end  in  being 
prepared  for  all  eventualities.  That  is 
preparedness. 

The  first  requisite  for  national  pre- 
paredness, in  view  of  the  complicated, 
costly,  and  scientific  military  apparatus 
now  employed  in  warfare,  is  a  highly  ef- 


\ 


PKEPAREDNESS  191 

ficient  civil  government.  The  main  effi- 
cient in  modern  warfare  is  a  treasury 
balance  on  the  right  side,  a  prosperous 
national  agriculture,  and  a  rich  and  prof- 
itable national  commerce.  In  a  strong 
government  all  the  national  industries 
and  organizations  are  sustained  and 
made  successful  by  judicious  and  highly 
scientific  measures.  Nothing  good  in 
the  state  is  allowed  to  fall  down.  The 
education,  the  morale,  the  health,  and  the 
prosperity  of  the  people  of  the  na- 
tion are  at  all  times  maintained  by  gov- 
ernmental regulations  at  the  highest 
stages  of  national  efficiency.  This  de- 
sirable condition  can  be  brought  about 
only  by  a  government  conducted  on  the 
highest  possible  plane.  Good  govern- 
ment is  essential  to  a  strong  and  power- 
ful nation  and  to  preparedness. 

Preparedness  for  America  takes  into 
consideration  the  extent  of  the  territory 


192     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

to  be  defended.  America  has  four  mili- 
tary fronts  open  to  enemy  attack.  The 
Pacific  coast-line  is  exposed  to  attack 
by  any  great  Asiatic  power.  The  Atlan- 
tic coast  is  exposed  to  the  hostile  actions 
of  any  European  power  at  war  with  the 
United  States.  Mexico  and  Canada, 
both  weak  countries,  are  not  able  to  de- 
fend their  neutrality,  and  the  territories 
of  either  or  both  may  be  readily  used  as  a 
base  by  any  great  power  or  combination 
of  powers  at  war  with  the  United  States. 
Future  wars  will  probably  be  conducted 
by  groups  of  powers  allied  for  the  time 
being.  An  attack  on  America  may  be 
simultaneously  made  on  all  its  fronts. 
Preparedness  for  America,  therefore, 
presents  the  problem  how  best  to  defend 
the  country  against  hostile  attacks  from 
any  or  all  directions.  Preparedness  in 
America  is  not  an  aggressive,  but  a  de- 
fensive, policy  for  a  naturally  peaceful 


I 


PREPAEEDNESS  193 

and  rich  country  living  under  a  lax  and 
decentralized  government  in  times  of 
peace.  In  times  of  war  American  Gov- 
ernment, like  the  Roman,  becomes  more 
highly  centralized,  indeed  a  virtual  dic- 
tatorship of  an  extremely  powerful  kind. 
The  difficulty  in  America  is  that  the  con- 
version from  one  form  of  government 
adapted  to  peace  to  the  other  form  more 
adapted  for  war  takes  time.  In  modem 
warfare  there  is  little  time  given  for 
preparedness.  Consequently,  if  Amer- 
ica wishes  to  continue  as  it  is,  it  must 
live  under  a  regime  of  preparedness. 
Most  sensible  men  who  love  peace  and 
security  support  a  national  scheme  for 
minimum  preparedness. 

If  Canada  and  Mexico  were  by  proper 
and  friendly  treaties  committed  to  some 
general  alliance  by  which  the  whole  of 
North  America  was  obligated  to  resist 
hostile  aggressions  from  across  the  seas, 


194     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

the  problem  of  preparedness  would  for 
the  United  States  be  much  simplified. 
America  would  then  be  virtually  an  in- 
sular country.  The  first  line  of  defense 
would  be  exclusively  on  the  high  seas, 
and  this  line  could  be  held  for  a  long  time 
by  a  powerful  and  efificient  navy.  For 
the  purposes  of  the  exterior  line  of  de- 
fense America  should  possess  in  the 
Pacific  a  modern  fleet  equal  to  that  of  the 
greatest  Asiatic  power.  In  the  Atlan- 
tic, America  should  maintain  a  fleet 
equal  to  that  of  the  greatest  European 
power.  With  a  coast-line  of  6000  miles 
to  guard,  a  little  navy  is  of  no  use  to  the 
country.  It  would  be  better  for  Amer- 
ica to  abolish  the  naval  service  alto- 
gether than  to  trust  its  defense  to  a  small 
navy.  A  navy  of  the  size  here  suggested 
would  be  an  adequate  protection  for  a 
great  and  a  rich  country  and  enable  it  to 


PREPAREDNESS  195 

meet  the  attacks  which  are  sure  to  come 
in  the  future  of  the  nation. 

The  second  line  of  defense  for  the 
proper  security  of  America  consists  of 
the  modem  fortifications  and  military- 
protective  works  necessary  to  guard  the 
harbors  and  landing-places  available  for 
an  enemy.  To  guard  the  second  line  the 
strongest  possible  modem  fortresses 
should  exist  not  at  some  points  of  the 
coast,  but  at  all  necessary  points.  Kept 
fully  equipped  with  ordnance  of  the 
greatest  power  and  range  and  with  all 
the  most  advanced  auxiliaries  of  modern 
defense,  the  second  line  of  defense  would 
be  a  protection  to  the  country  of  the  most 
efficient  kind  which  it  is  overt  treason  in 
the  military  and  the  congressional  au- 
thorities to  neglect.  The  supplements  to 
this  second  line  of  defense,  the  routes  of 
quick  communications,  have  not  yet  re- 


196     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

ceived  all  the  attention  their  great  im- 
portance demands  of  the  authorities. 
There  is  now  no  system  of  strategical 
railways  in  America.  But  this  defect 
can  be  readily  overcome.  The  third  line 
of  defense  is  the  army.  The  character 
and  quality  of  this  branch  of  the  national 
defense  is  the  supreme  military  problem. 
The  United  States  will  soon  have  to 
protect  over  two  hundred  millions  of 
prosperous  and  peaceful  citizens.  It  is 
thought  by  the  best  military  authority 
that  a  standing  army,  for  the  effective 
defensive  purposes  of  such  a  vast  popu- 
lation, should  consist  of  at  least  half  a 
million  men.  This  would  be  only  one 
fourth  of  one  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
Two  hundred  thousand  soldiers  would 
be  required  in  the  West  and  as  many 
more  in  the  East.  One  hundred  thou- 
sand would  be  held  in  a  central  position, 
where   they  could  easily  be   mobilized 


i 


PREPAREDNESS  197 

either  on  the  Southern  or  the  Northern 
borders  as  the  need  developed.  Such  a 
regular  army,  if  highly  trained  and  disci- 
plined in  the  most  modern  and  scientific 
methods,  would  be  the  nucleus  of  the 
greater  army  of  national  defense.  Un- 
der-disciplined, carelessly  trained,  or  ob- 
soletely  armed  and  equipped,  a  regular 
army  of  even  500,000  would  be  worse 
than  useless  to  the  nation.  An  eflScient 
modern  army  requires  not  only  the  most 
modern  equipment,  but  an  abundance  of 
trained  officers  possessed  of  the  best  at- 
tainable military  education.  The  Mili- 
tary Academy  and  the  war  colleges  in 
America  must  therefore  be  kept  superior 
to  the  best  foreign  standards.  That 
they  are  so  now  many  traveled  Ameri- 
cans very  much  doubt;  there  are  too 
many  signs  to  the  contrary. 

It  is  generally  assumed  that  a  standing 
army  has  not  been  popular  in  America. 


198     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

Certainly  many  American  politicians  of 
the  easy-going,  every-day  variety  have 
been  opposed  to  a  standing  army, 
and  the  demagogues  among  them  have 
long  proclaimed  that  a  standing  army  is 
a  menace  to  liberty.  But  all  Americans 
are  not  of  the  politician  kind.  Some  of 
them  are  beginning  to  be  convinced  that 
in  such  a  vast  country,  so  rich  and  so 
largely  populated,  a  regular  army  has 
become  necessary  for  defense.  A  regu- 
lar American  Army,  as  most  intelligent 
men  believe,  would  have  little  power  to 
harm  liberty.  Many  civilians  are  now 
convinced  that  the  power  for  good  of  a 
regular  army  would  more  than  compen- 
sate for  any  risk  it  entails.  A  regular 
army  would  not  bring  about  a  perpetual 
dictatorship  a  day  sooner.  America 
will  not  submit  to  a  dictatorship  until 
the  country  has  become  so  fallen  and  so 
utterly  wretched  as  to  be  able  to  be  saved 


PREPAREDNESS  199 

from  disorder  in  no  other  way.  When 
America  has  fallen  into  that  degraded 
condition,  no  regular  army  will  be  nec- 
essary to  bring  about  a  dictatorship. 
When  the  time  is  ripe,  a  dictatorship  will 
come  about  in  America  by  acclamation, 
just  as  it  came  about  in  ancient  Rome. 
In  all  probability  the  American  Republic 
will  not  for  centuries  fall  through  the 
rise  of  a  dictator  or  through  the  machin- 
ations of  ambitious  men.  If  it  falls,  it 
will  be  through  a  conquest  by  stronger 
powers. 

It  is  thought  by  skilled  military  men 
to  be  possible  for  a  combination  of  pow- 
ers at  war  with  America  to  land  in  North 
America  in  a  comparatively  brief  space 
of  time  a  million  trained  soldiers,  prop- 
erly equipped.  There  are  now  at  least 
eight  of  the  great  powers  each  of  which 
has  an  army  of  far  more  than  two  and 
a  half  million  men.    To  cope  with  half 


200     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

this  number  speedily,  a  regular  army  of 
500,000  men,  scattered  throughout  the 
United  States,  is  conceded  by  experts  to 
be  wholly  inadequate.  A  large  part  of 
the  regulars  would  be  required  at  the 
principal  military  stations  throughout 
so  vast  a  country.  The  regular  army  in 
America  must  therefore  be  largely  sup- 
plemented by  a  national  army  quickly 
mobilized  for  the  purpose  of  defense.  A 
national  army  should  be  composed  in  the 
last  extremity  of  all  the  men  of  military 
age.  Probably  there  would  never  be  an 
occasion  when  all  would  be  called  into 
the  field. 

The  old  militia  system  is  obsolete  and 
useless  for  defense.  The  testimony  of 
the  leading  military  authorities  in  Amer- 
ica, from  Washington  down,  is,  in  sub- 
stance, that  a  militia  is  not  an  effective 
military  arm  of  the  nation.  Since 
Washington  complained  of  the  militia  it 


I 


PREPAREDNESS  201 

has  become,  under  modern  conditions, 
even  less  effective.  However  well  dis- 
posed and  patriotic  the  militia  may  be,  it 
requires  immediate  reorganization  in 
every  war.  It  is  always  reorganized  as 
a  national  army.  Consequently,  it  has 
become  the  general  opinion  in  the  coun- 
try that  the  old  militia  system  is  obso- 
lete and  that  it  must  give  way  to  univer- 
sal military  service,  preferably  on  the 
Swiss  plan.  The  Swiss  or  the  Austra- 
lian plan  seems  to  be  the  most  demo- 
cratic and  the  least  expensive  plan  for 
the  national  army  of  a  republic.  The 
time  it  requires  for  training  is  short ;  it 
interferes  little  with  the  ordinary  pur- 
suits of  the  young  men  of  the  nation, 
while  its  cost  to  the  republic  is  compara- 
tively small. 

The  Swiss  system  gives  to  every  male 
under  age,  as  a  part  of  his  general  edu- 
cation, a  compulsory  military  training  of 


202     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

about  one  year.  Thereafter  the  only  ad- 
ditional military  training  necessary  is 
about  sixty-five  days  for  the  infantry, 
seventy-five  for  field  artillery,  and  ninety 
days  for  the  cavalry.  The  subsequent 
trainings,  known  as  ''repetition 
courses,"  are  confined  to  eleven  days 
annually.  After  their  twenty-third  year 
the  young  men  are  placed  in  the  reserve. 
The  reserve  is  called  upon  only  in  cases 
of  dire  necessity.  The  Swiss  system,  if 
adopted  in  the  United  States  as  in  Aus- 
tralia, would  have  the  merit  of  not  seri- 
ously interfering  with  the  civil  life  and 
industries  of  the  country,  while  it  would 
create  a  national  army  of  millions  of 
men,  trained,  disciplined,  and  effective 
for  all  purposes  of  defense.  Together 
with  the  regular  army  and  navy,  this  sys- 
tem would  render  the  country  invulner- 
able to  attack,  and  thus  tend  to  make  it 
immune  from  hostile  aggression. 


PREPAREDNESS  203 

The  unfortunate  tendency  in  America 
has  been  toward  a  general  indisposition 
to  undergo  military  hardships  of  any 
kind.  The  inclination  of  the  young  men 
in  particular  is  to  seek  the  softer,  the 
slouching,  and  the  indifferent  phases  of 
life.  This  tendency  would  be  overcome 
if  the  Swiss  system  were  adopted.  In- 
tensive military  training  promotes  the 
general  health,  discipline,  and  order  in 
ways  most  valuable  for  the  country  at 
large.  A  hardy  body  of  young  men, 
drilled,  disciplined,  and  obedient  to  au- 
thority, would  invigorate  the  whole  coun- 
try and  stimulate  the  desired  public  or- 
der in  all  directions.  Besides,  universal 
military  training  would  create  a  patri- 
otic spirit  and  a  love  of  country,  without 
which  no  country  can  be  in  a  healthy  or 
a  sound  condition.  Unless  in  such  a  con- 
dition, a  nation  is  not  prepared  to  meet 
all  the  vicissitudes  of  national  existence, 


204     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

and  it  ultimately  would  fall  down  before 
stronger  and  better-prepared  nations. 

If  the  United  States  were  to  adopt  the 
Swiss  system,  a  great  national  auxiliary 
army  of  the  highest  efficiency  for  all  pur- 
poses would  at  once  spring  into  being. 
Universal  military  service  is  thoroughly 
democratic  and  consistent  with  modern 
pressure.  Modern  military  movements 
are  so  speedy  that  there  is  now  no  time 
given  to  create  an  army.  An  army  must 
in  modern  times  be  in  existence  and  able 
to  be  mobilized,  thoroughly  armed  and 
equipped  within  a  few  days.  Every  man 
enrolled  in  the  general  army  should  al- 
ways know  his  station  in  the  event  that 
the  general  army  is  quickly  mobilized. 
Mobilization  requires  that  the  arms  and 
equipment  of  the  army  shall  always  be 
ready.  The  greatest  test  of  the  military 
efficiency  of  a  nation  is  the  speed  with 
which  mobilization  may  be  effected. 


PREPAREDNESS  205 

In  order  to  mobilize  speedily,"  every- 
thing must  be  ready.  Modem  guns  and 
military  material  have  become  so  elabo- 
rate and  scientific  that  they  cannot  be 
improvised  within  a  moderate  space  of 
time.  They  must  be  always  on  hand. 
Nothing  can  now  be  left  to  the  future  or 
chance.  The  general  staff  should  there- 
fore always  know  that  all  the  necessary 
military  equipment  and  appliances  for 
the  army  and  navy  are  ready  to  meet  an 
attack  from  any  quarter.  The  expense 
to  the  nation  of  being  ready  is  small 
compared  with  the  cost  to  a  rich  nation 
caught  unprepared.  Improvidence  and 
lack  of  military  preparation  have  cost 
the  United  States  far  more  in  the  ag- 
gregate than  the  largest  standing  army 
has  cost  the  most  warlike  nation  in 
Europe. 

The  cost  of  maintaining  a  proper  and 
eJBficient  military  establishment  in  the 


206     AMERICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

United  States  in  time  of  peace  would  be 
far  less  than  the  cost  of  a  hurried  and 
nervous  preparation  on  the  eve  of  a 
great  war.  Statistics  show  that  the  cost 
of  the  past  wars  conducted  by  the  United 
States  under  the  old  plan  of  voluntary 
enlistment  and  improvised  preparation 
for  war  has  been  the  greatest  of  all  mod- 
ern wars.  Indeed,  the  expenditures  for 
military  purposes  in  the  United  States 
have  in  recent  years  been  almost  as  great 
as  those  of  the  most  efficient  military 
powers  in  Europe.  In  the  United  States 
only  has  the  vast  expenditure  for  mili- 
tary purposes  been  wasted  and  useless. 
From  the  present  outlook  it  would  ap- 
pear that  Americans  have  now  deter- 
mined to  substitute  an  intelligent  scheme 
of  defense  for  the  past  wasteful  extrava- 
gance amounting  to  national  debauch. 
How  best  to  accomplish  it  is  the  problem 
of  preparedness. 


PREPAREDNESS  207 

All  the  former  national  wars  of  Amer- 
ica have  been  conducted  in  circum- 
stances more  favorable  than  will  occur 
again.  The  adversaries  have  been  either 
weak  nations  or  the  terrain  has  been 
of  America's  own  choice.  Conditions 
have  greatly  changed.  In  the  employ- 
ment of  the  old  rifle  or  musket  American 
farmers  and  frontiersmen  of  the  last 
century  needed  little  training  to  make 
them  eflBcient;  they  were  accustomed  to 
the  use  of  these  arms.  With  the  disap- 
pearance of  large  game  and  the  old  fron- 
tier life,  all  this  former  advantage  has 
been  lost.  In  the  use  of  modern  weap- 
ons of  defense  no  other  nation  is  now 
more  unskilled  than  the  American.  In 
modern  warfare  neither  arms  nor  their 
proper  employment  can  be  suddenly  im- 
provised. Their  production  and  their 
skilful  use  require  a  long  period  of 
preparation  in  times  of  peace. 


208     AMEEICA  AFTER  THE  WAR 

Unless  America  arouses  itself  to  the 
necessity  of  preparedness  as  a  policy, 
it  is  doomed  sooner  or  later  to  destruc- 
tion as  a  great  power.  There  are  ele- 
ments of  dissolution  within  every  organ- 
ism ;  there  are  also  foes  external  as  well 
as  foes  internal.  Preparedness  would 
postpone  the  natural  operation  of  these 
forces  for  centuries,  perhaps.  Of  all 
the  enemies  of  a  great  nation  the  worst 
are  the  dreamers  who  see  ahead  an  era 
of  universal  and  perpetual  peace.  As 
man  is  constituted,  perpetual  peace  is 
impossible.  The  life  of  nations,  like  the 
life  of  man,  is  one  long  struggle.  Only 
that  nation  will  survive  which  is  strong 
in  all  directions. 


THE  END 


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